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Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy
Patients?

PROBLEMS WITH THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
HEALTH INSURANCE CONTRACTS*

Wendy K. Mariner'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The managed care industry has historically relied on
contracts to manage patients' access to medical care, primarily
to control costs. Nevertheless, health care costs and insurance
premiums are rising.' The contractual model appears to have
© 2004 Wendy K Mariner. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of Public Health;
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Professor of Socio-Medical Sciences
and Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine. J.D. Columbia
University School of Law; LL.M New York University School of Law; M.P.H. Harvard
School of Public Health. This Article is part of the Edward V. Sparer Public Interest
Law Symposium, The New Economy and the Unraveling Social Safety Net.
I Jon Gabel, Gary Claxton, Erin Holve, Jeremy Pickreign, Heidi Whitmore,
Kelley Khont, Samantha Hawkins & Diane Rowland, Health Benefits in 2003:
Premiums Reach Thirteen-Year High As Employers Adopt New Forms of Cost Sharing,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2003, at 117; Paul Fronstin, National Health Spending Up
8.7 Percent Between 2000-2001: Spending for Health Care Will Continue to Grow, 24

EBRI NOTES 1 (June 2003); Bradley C. Strunk & Paul B. Ginsburg, Tracking Health
Care Costs: Trends Stabilize But Remain High in 2002, HEALTH AFFAIRS, June 11,

2003, at W3-266, at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprinthlthaff.w3.266vl.pdf;
Survey of Employers Sees Big Increase Coming for Costs of Health Care in 2003, BNA
HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT, Oct. 7, 2002, at 1340; Jon Gabel, Larry Levitt, Jeremy

Pickreign, Heidi Whitmore, Erin Holve, Diane Rowland, Kelley Dhont & Samantha
Hawkins, Job-Based Health Insurancein 2001: Inflation Hits Double Digits, Managed
Care Retreats, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 180; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
COVERAGE MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE (2001).

Both managed care and managed competition were advocated as the
solution to rising costs. See, e.g., Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A ConsumerChoice Health Plan for the 1990's: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to
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failed.2 The question is, why? Contracts have been used to
define rights and responsibilities for centuries.3 Everyone
agrees that unlimited rights to care regardless of cost - based
on patient demand and physician willingness to provide would bankrupt the system. But, if today's contracts do not
work, what will?
This Article examines the role of health insurance
contracts in defining and enforcing access to medical care. It
focuses primarily on employment-based group health benefit
plans, although much of the discussion may apply to
government programs and individual insurance policies. Part
II describes how contracts are used to control health care costs,
and briefly recaps contrasting attitudes toward the role of
private contracting in proposals for health insurance reform.
Contracts are likely to remain an essential tool for defining
rights to care in any future health care financing system. Yet
they are often the source, rather than the resolution, of
Promote Quality and Economy, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 94 (1989). Drew Altman and
Larry Levitt graphed health expenditures from 1961 to 2000 to demonstrate that no
policy measure has controlled the rise of costs over the long run. Drew E. Altman &
Larry Levitt, The Sad History of Health Care Cost Containment as Told in One Chart,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan. 23, 2002, at W83, at httpJ/content.healthaffairs.org/
cgilreprint/hlthaff.w2.83v1.pdf. Henry Aaron responded that he, like Chief Renault in
"Casablanca," was "shocked, shocked" at the numbers. Henry J. Aaron, The
UnsurprisingSurprise of Renewed Health Care Cost Inflation, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan.
23, 2002, at W85, at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/Wthaff.w2.85vl.pdf.
Aaron has correctly predicted intractable cost increases for years. See Henry J. Aaron,
A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Managed Competition, 27 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 31 (2002); Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The
Choice Before Us, 247 SCIENCE 418 (1990). Forces little affected by the policy measures
tried so far continue to exert upward pressure on the prices and use of health care: new
technology added to the medical armamentarium, an aging population that uses more
services, and perhaps even what Professor Annas calls a culture in which many people
believe that death is optional. See, generally, GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW,
MEDICINE AND THE MARKET 73-77 (1998).
2 Altman & Levitt, supra note 1, at W84 (noting that many believe that we
will not control costs unless we ration medical care). See also GEORGE J. ANNAS,
STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS 211-217 (1993); DANIEL
CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY (1987); Aaron &
Schwartz, supra note 1. Others argue that health care is already rationed to some
degree by price in the United States. See EMILY FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHT THING: TEN
YEARS OF ETHICS COLUMNS FROM THE HEALTHCARE FORUM (1996); Wendy K. Mariner,
Rationing Health Care and the Need for Credible Scarcity: Why Americans Can't Say
No, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1439 (1995).
3 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999).
4 See generally MEDICINE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS ON THE DISTRIBUTION
OF HEALTH CARE (Rosamond Rhodes et al. eds., 2002); THOMAS H. RICE, THE
ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED (1st ed., 1998); GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME
CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE AND THE MARKET (1998); THEODORE R. MARMOR,
UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE REFORM (1994); DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF
LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS (1990).
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disputes between patients and insurers. Without a better
understanding of why patients resist contractual limits, efforts
to control health care costs by attempting to enforce
contractual limits are likely to continue to fail.
Part III notes differences between consumers who
purchase health plans and patients who seek medical care, and
why contract and insurance rules developed for consumers may
not wholly suit the individuals in their roles as patients. Part
IV then describes consumer-choice health plans, which conform
health insurance more closely to a consumer good and expand
the use of contractual obligations to control health care costs by
shifting more responsibility for choice to consumers. Part V
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of such plans for
employers, consumers, and patients, as well as their
implications for expanding health insurance coverage and
controlling health care costs. Part VI expands the analysis,
exploring the difficulties of using the consumer model to
constrain future choices about health care, and concludes that
efforts to force health insurance into a consumer model are not
likely to avoid the disputes over coverage that have bedeviled
patients in managed care. For all its appeal, the consumerchoice approach ultimately fails to confront or solve a
fundamental problem contributing to the rise in health care
costs today - disputes over benefit coverage.
Part VII questions whether rules designed for consumer
transactions can satisfactorily resolve disputes between
insurers and patients. I hypothesize that the most intractable
disputes between patient and insurer might be classified into
several categories, a hypothesis that calls for empirical testing.
A brief overview of normally applicable contract rules
highlights instances in which current doctrines and rules may
fail to resolve disputes in these categories in a manner that
generally satisfies both parties. Several assumptions
underlying consumer-oriented contract rules do not easily fit
the relationship between health insurer and patient and may
exacerbate resistance to their enforcement. Ultimately, this
Part concludes that modified or new rules that better fit that
relationship may be needed to minimize opportunities for
dispute. This Article does not purport to develop any new rules
itself. Rather, it suggests the questions that require deeper
analysis before we can begin to develop, interpret, and enforce
contracts that better calibrate the relationship between insurer
and patient. Where that is not possible within the contract
rubric, it may be better to pursue alternative mechanisms for
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specifying
future
health
insurance
obligations
and
entitlements, mechanisms that can both gain willing
acceptance by all concerned and ameliorate the rising costs of
care.
II. THE USE OF CONTRACTS IN HEALTH REFORM
Few people question the utility of contracts in their
daily lives, whether it be for buying consumer goods like cars,
renting an apartment for a year or a hotel room for a night,
opening a bank account, or hiring employees. In theory,
contracts embody a voluntary agreement. Yet contracts that
attempt to define legal rights to medical care and the
concomitant responsibility for providing that care have often
become the source, rather than the resolution, of disagreement.
In the 1990s, consumer opposition to contractual limits on care
fueled a popular backlash against managed care.' Additionally,
health insurers have been inconsistent in enforcing contractual
limits, sometimes succumbing to legal, political, or personal
pressure to provide care that is not covered by the contract, and
sometimes denying care that appears covered and appropriate.
Contractual limits cannot control costs as long as one or the
other party does not abide by - or agree with - the limits.
When it comes to health care, the fact that limits are set forth
in a contract does not appear to be sufficient reason, by itself,
to make those limits acceptable.!
' See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Consumer Choice Under "Private Health Care
Regulation," in REGULATING MANAGED CARE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND FUTURE OPTIONS
91-116 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1999) (noting that resistance to managed care
arose in part from employees' perception that private insurers were limiting their
access to what had been essentially free care at the point of service); Marc A. Rodwin,
Backlash as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1115
(1999) (issue dedicated to discussion of the managed care "backlash"); Peter D.
Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 365
(2003).
6 There are many plausible reasons why managed care contracts have given
rise to disputes. Consumers may not have an adequate understanding of managed care
in general or their health plan in particular. Lois A. Vitt, Jurg K Siegenthaler, Linda
Siegenthaler, Deanna M. Lyter & Jamie Kent, Consumer Health Care Finances and
Education: Matters of Values, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, No. 241, Jan. 2002. But even
extensive education - not likely to be forthcoming - may not be enough to gain willing
agreement to all the terms of a contract. Many people feel entitled to medical care, at
least when they are ill or injured. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985).
Contrary to market theory, consumers do not always want their contracts to be
enforced. See generally Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health
Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 287 (1993). When consumers get sick, they
become patients and are likely to demand whatever care they or their physicians
believe they need, regardless of what the contract says. See Wendy K Mariner,
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More than half of all Americans obtain health care with
private insurance provided through employers or unions.7 The
vast majority, about 145 million in 2001, are employed by
Exactly what these
private, non-government employers
individuals are entitled to, and how much it costs, depends on
the terms of a contract. Most of these contracts still provide for
"managed care" to some degree, in a variety of structures,9 but
others offer indemnity insurance, flexible benefits, and
increasingly, consumer-driven and defined contribution plans."°
New forms of insurance are being developed and consumers
may increasingly participate in negotiating contracts for their

Standardsof Care and Standard Form Contracts: DistinguishingPatient Rights and
Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLy 1 (1998)
[hereinafter Mariner, Standardsof Care].
Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristicsof the
Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2001 Current PopulationSurvey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF,
No. 240, Dec. 2001 (reporting that 163.4 million people in 2000 - 67.3% of all nonelderly Americans - had employment-based health insurance). Numbers declined
slightly in 2001, with 162.3 million non-elderly workers and their dependents, 65.6% of
the total, covered by employment-based coverage, including 145 million private sector
and 17.7 million public sector employees and dependents. Paul Fronstin, Sources of
Health Insurance and Characteristicsof the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2002
Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, No. 252, Dec. 2002 [hereinafter
Fronstin2002].
Fronstin 2002, supra note 7. There were about 247.5 million Americans
under age 65 in 2001. Those not included in private, non-government, employment
based plans were: 17.7 million in government employee group plans; 16.4 million with
non-employer, individual insurance coverage; 37.9 million in public benefit programs,
and 40.9 million uninsured. Id. See also Craig Copeland, Nonelderly Individuals with
Employment-Based and Individually PurchasedHealth Care Coverage, 20 EBRI NOTES
3 (2000) (reporting that 125.7 million Americans were covered by private, nongovernment employer plans in 1998).
The most familiar models include health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), which offer a closed panel of providers and no coverage of services by nonparticipating providers; preferred provider organizations (PPOs), which offer a
contracted network of participating providers typically paid on a fee-for-service or
discounted fee-for-service basis; point of service plans (POSs), which cover services
from participating providers and also allow patients to obtain care from nonparticipating providers upon payment of larger deductibles or co-payments. In general,
premiums for these plans are lowest for HMOs and highest for POSs or general
indemnity plans. Each model has variations and include "OWA's," Allison Overbay and
Mark Hall's joking acronym for Jason Adkin's 'other weird arrangements." Allison
Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers That Bear Risk, 22 AM. J.L. &
MED. 361,361 n.2 (1996).
'( See Defined ContributionHealth Plans Emerge as Employers Face DoubleDigit Cost Hikes, BNA HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT, Feb. 25, 2002, at 307 [hereinafter
Defined Contribution Health Plans]; Consultant Survey Says Employers Unlikely to
Make DramaticChanges to Rein in Costs, BNA HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT, July 15,
2002, at 962. See also Robert D. Reischauer, Choice and Social Insurance, in SOCIAL
SECURITY AND MEDICARE: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY
19 (Sheila Burke, Eric Kingson & Uwe Reinhardt eds., 2000) (arguing that rising costs
also led to exploring defined contribution elements for Social Security).
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own care. Managed care contracts may be an inadequate model
for the future."
Professor Clark Havighurst has argued that contracts
can be an effective tool of health care reform, especially when
used to encourage consumers to make better bargains with
managed cared organizations (MCOs), and when focused on the
quality of care.'2 Other scholars argue that if insurers,
employers and consumers are free to make their own
agreements, without significant regulation of the health
insurance market, they will voluntarily control costs more
effectively than government.'" Rising costs and a backlash
against managed care suggest that the managed care
contractual model has not met those expectations. 4 More
important, a pure market approach rarely takes into account
whether the terms of a contract are fair to consumers as well as
insurers."
Other scholars concerned with equitable access to care
for all Americans more often recommend legislation to
restructure health care financing and delivery.'6 However,
1

Victor R. Fuchs, What's Ahead for Health Insurance in the United States?,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1822 (2002).
12 Clark C. Havighurst, Freedom of Contract: The Unexplored Path to Health
Care Reform, in AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: GOVERNMENT, MARKET PROCESSES AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 145 (Roger D. Feldman ed., 2000); CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH
CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995).
13 This was the premise of earlier proposals for managed competition.
See
Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 1; Paul M. Ellwood, Alain C. Enthoven & Lynn
Etheredge, The Jackson Hole Initiative for a Twenty-First Century American Health
Care System, 1 HEALTH ECONOMICS 158-59 (1992). The scholarly debate on this issue
has followed the lines of the debate over whether private contracting is preferable to or
more just than tort standards and regulation in health care. For those in addition to
Havighurst who favor private contracting, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust,
55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002); MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS:
THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING DECISIONS (1997); MARK A. HALL,
REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE (1994); E. HAAVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH
CARE ACCOUNTABLE: LAW AND THE NEW MEDICAL MARKETPLACE (2001); David A.
Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 So.
CAL. L. REV. 221 (2000).
14 Another managed care proponent, Paul Ellwood of the
Jackson Hole
Group, was reported to say, "Under managed care, we were going to let the market
decide - the best delivery system would emerge from that.... I no longer believe that."
"Pioneerof Managed Care" Proposed New Generationof Health Care Delivery, 11 BNA
HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT 167 (2003).
"' Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard:Insuranceas Moral Opportunity,
6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11 (1999).
16 Most of these scholars are skeptical of
or frankly oppose unconstrained
private contracting as the sole mechanism for distributing health care. See, e.g, M.
Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919
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political support for major health system change has not yet
materialized." Insurers, employers and patients are still left to
their own devices to arrange for health care within affordable
limits. These devices will undoubtedly continue to be contracts.
The relatively recent so-called "consumer-choice" health plans
rely on contracts to make consumers more aware of health care
costs.'8 Even incremental reform legislation, like the stalled
Senate and House of Representatives versions of a Bipartisan
Patient Protection Act, assumes that private parties will use
contracts to determine what care is available to whom.'" Thus,
contracts appear to be an inevitable part of any future health
care financing system. Yet, we do not fully understand where
private contracting does and does not work to further the goals
of equitable access to affordable care.
III. PATIENTS AND CONSUMERS
Various terms describe people covered by health
insurance. Insurance texts prefer "insureds" as a generic term
for anyone who is insured." Managed care organizations often
speak of "enrollees" or "members." Today, most everyone refers
to all these people as "consumers."" Does the shift in
terminology have any substantive import for health policy or
(2002); Uwe E. Reinhardt. Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal Dilemma,
19 AM. J.L. & MED. 21 (1993).
17 See generally Robert J.
Blendon, John M. Benson & Catherine M.
DesRoches, Americans' Views of the Uninsured: An Era for Hybrid Proposals,HEALTH
AFFAIRS, AUG. 27, 2003, at W3-405, at http://content.healthaffairs.orgcgi/
reprint/hlthaff.w3.405v1.pdf; Uwe E. Reinhardt, Is There Hope for the Uninsured?,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Aug. 27, 2003, at W3-376, at http://content.healthaffairs.orgcgi/
reprint/hlthaff.w3.376vl.pdf; Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, Americans' Views
on Health Policy: A Fifty-Year HistoricalPerspective, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2001,
at 33.
"' Consumer-choice models are described in Part IV, infra.
'9 Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001, S.1052, 197th Cong. (2001); H.R.
2563, 197th Cong. (2001).
'0 See, e.g., ERIC M. HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1996 & Supp.); LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE (3d ed. 1995); ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (2d
ed. 1996); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES (1988).
21 The use of "consumer" was emphasized by the President's Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. See
CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (Nov. 1997), available at http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/cborr/.
The managed care industry has used the term, often interchangeably with "member,"
in its public statements. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE,
STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS (2002).
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law? Dr. Edmund Pellegrino argues that terminology can in
fact change public perceptions, especially in health care.'
Professor George Annas argues that transforming patients into
consumers could deprive patients of important traditional
rights.23 This is because the laws generally applicable to
consumers differ in significant respects from those applicable
to patients.2
A.

The Balance of Information

Historically, laws governing patient rights and provider
responsibilities have been based on the patient's disadvantage
relative to medical professionals.2 Although in the nineteenth
century Sir Henry Maine characterized "the movement of
progressive societies [as] a movement from Status to
Contract,"" the rights of patients in the twentieth century
developed because of their unequal status in a relationship
with a medical professional.27 Today, this inherent imbalance in
knowledge and skill remains a defining characteristic of the
physician-patient relationship. Laws typically attempt to
22 Edmund D. Pellegrino, Words Can Hurt You: Some
Reflections on the
Metaphors of Managed Care, 7 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 505 (1994).
23 George J. Annas, A National Bill of Patients'
Rights, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED.
695, 696 (1998); George J. Annas, Reframing the Debate on Health Care by Replacing
Our Metaphors, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 744 (1995).
24 Mariner, Standards of Care, supra note 6 (outlining differences
between
consumers and patients and emphasizing that consumers are buyers of care, while
patients are recipients of care without regard to any source of payment). The discussion
in this Part is based largely on that article.
2' GEORGE J. ANNAS, RIGHTS OF PATIENTS (3d
ed. 2004); ELEANOR D. KINNEY,
PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS (2002).
26 SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 168-70 (Thoemmes
Press 1996)
(1861)
The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect.
Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of
family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place .... If
then we employ Status . . . to signify these personal conditions only, and
avoid applying the term to such conditions as are the immediate or remote
result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the progressive
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.
Id.
27 Not all law governing modern relationships are left to contract.
Like laws
protecting patients, laws prohibiting certain types of discrimination recognize the need
to protect individuals who are vulnerable because of personal characteristics, or status,
such as race, color, ethnicity, gender or disability. See generally ANDREW KOPPELLMAN,
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1996); HAROLD S. LEWIS &
ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE (2002);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY (2002). Thus, it might be said that the
hallmark of progressive twentieth century societies has been a selective move from
contract to status to preserve individual integrity.
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counter this imbalance and protect patients from mistreatment
by physicians whose actions patients cannot independently
evaluate. 8
In contrast, consumers are presumed to have equal
bargaining power with sellers. Voluntary choice and
willingness and ability to pay are the hallmarks of consumer
9
purchasing, especially in a competitive market. Ability to pay
constrains consumer choice, however, and consequently limits
a product's consumer base to those people who can afford to
buy that product. In addition, consumers may not have
adequate information about a product or service to make
wholly rational and voluntary choices. Consumer protection
laws seek to redress this information imbalance by requiring
sellers to disclose material information that is not generally
available to the public, thereby supporting the consumer's
ability to make an informed choice."
In the medical context, one might compare consumer
disclosure laws to the physician's duty under the tort doctrine
of informed consent to disclose sufficient information to permit
informed consent to medical care. The physician's duty arises
from the patient's personal right of self-determination, which
entitles the patient to whatever information she needs and
wants to make medical care decisions. In contrast, consumers
have no comparable personal right to information by virtue of
their status as consumers. Consumer disclosure laws are
designed to fill gaps in general knowledge in a population of
undifferentiated consumers, and the seller's duty is imposed to
protect fair commercial exchanges.

28

Traditional laws protecting patients include legislation and common law

principles requiring physicians to provide care in accordance with professionally
accepted standards of care and to act in the patient's best interest; requiring physicians
and hospitals to keep personal medical information about patients confidential; the
doctrine of informed consent to medical care (and research); the right to privacy and
dignity in patient care; and the right to emergency care. See ANNAS, supra note 25.
Advances in medicine may have increased the need for laws to protect patients,
particularly the doctrine of informed consent to medical treatment, because diagnostic
methods and treatment options are rarely within ordinary citizens' general knowledge.
See generally Wendy K Mariner, Informed Consent in the Post-ModernEra, 13 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 385 (1988).
See RICE, supra note 4 (arguing that none of the assumptions necessary to
an efficient, competitive market are met in health care markets).
30 Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform
Proposals and Trade-Offs, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1319 (1996) (comparing consumer
protection approaches from other sectors to managed care).
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Legal Obligationsand Their Sources

In general, tort law governs the physician-patient
relationship, while contract law governs the relationship
between consumers and sellers. Consumer protection laws
sometimes impose product standards on manufacturers of
goods,3' which can be seen as amendments to the contract of
sale. The general duty of physicians to conform their behavior
to accepted medical standards is almost never translated into
specific statutory standards for particular clinical services."
Instead, professional consensus, sometimes in the form of
guidelines adopted by professional specialty organizations,
establishes the standard of care.
In addition to adhering to accepted medical standards,
physicians have a quasi-fiduciary duty to act in the patient's
best interest.3 Sellers have no comparable fiduciary duty,
either to act in the consumer's best interest or to sell only what
the consumer needs.' Consumers are presumed to be the best
judge of their own purchases, whereas patients are presumed
to need the expert assistance of physicians to identify their own
medical needs. Where medical needs are obvious, individuals
can often buy remedies like aspirin over the counter, in which
case the individual acts more like a consumer than a patient.
The differences between patients and consumers are
summarized in Figure 1 below. Individuals can be both
consumers and patients, although they are rarely both at the
same time. People act like consumers when choosing what
31 For example, the Food and Drug Administration sets specific
standards for

drugs, biologics, medical devices, food, and cosmetics. 21 U.S.C. §§ 353, 371 (2000). The
Consumer Products Safety Commission also sets product specifications for certain
consumer products. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2058 (2000). State insurance licensure laws
requiring certain insurance policies to include specific provisions can also be viewed as
setting product standards. Common law may also protect consumers by subjecting
manufacturers of defective products to liability in tort for negligence or defective
products. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS

LIABILITY (Tentative Draft, 1994).
32 The most visible exception is legislation prohibiting
specific procedures for
abortion. See Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117
Stat. 1201 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000) (holding that a similar Nebraska law violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
33 See generally Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary
Metaphor: Divided
Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a ChangingHealth Care System, 21 AM. J.L. &
MED. 241 (1995).
34 See Wendy K Mariner, Business v. Medical
Ethics: Conflicting Standards
for Managed Care, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236, 238 (1995) (noting that for-profit
corporations have a fiduciary obligation to their investors).
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health plans to buy and like patients when deciding what
treatment to undergo. In addition, some elements of managed
care and other health plans, such as choosing physicians,
combine both consumer and patient functions.' Nevertheless, it
is useful to keep the distinctions in mind when considering
whether disputes arising out of health plans should be
addressed as a matter of common law contract or tort
principles, or by legislation. The more health care is perceived
to be a consumer good, the more likely it is that contract
principles will supersede tort principles in defining both access
to care and rights and obligations in care.
Figure 1: Differences Between Consumers and Patients
Consumer Characteristics

Patient
Characteristics

Buyers of goods and services

Recipients of health care

Purchases dependent on
financial resources

Independent of payment
source

Purchases based on voluntary
choice

Seek care based on need

Presumed equal bargaining
position with sellers

Unequal skill and knowledge of
health care

Sellers have no fiduciary duty
to buyer

Provider has quasi-fiduciary
duty to patient

IV. CONSUMER-CHOICE HEALTH PLANS
Current health care reforms encourage patients to
become consumers and ask them to control costs by choosing
cheaper health plans" and also assuming a larger share of the
For a more complete discussion of the categories of consumer, patient, and
mixed consumer/patient functions in managed care, see Mariner, Standards of Care,
supra note 6. See also KINNEY, supra note 25, at 9 (recognizing both the distinctions
and the overlapping functions).
36 Jon R. Gabel, Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Thomas Rice, Consumer-Driven
Health Plans: Are They More Than Talk Now?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov. 20, 2002, at
Defined
W395, at http://content.healthaffairs.orgcgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.395vl.pdf;
ContributionHealth Plans, supra note 10; Bill Brubaker, Co-Pay, or You Pay? Firms
Hope Worker-Directed Health Plans Will Curb Rising Costs, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002,
at H1.
35
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cost." Health plans are easing away from managing individual
patient care and shifting more decision-making responsibility
onto providers and patients, while incorporating more elements
of traditional indemnity insurance into their "new" plans." The
animating idea is to inject market concerns into consumer
choices - to make the cost of care and its trade-offs more visible
to the individuals who experience them. These consumer-choice
trends reduce insurers' involvement in personal treatment
decisions and emphasize their role in financing care. Although
insurers still make determinations about what premium they
will charge for any given package of benefits and whether a
particular condition or treatment is covered, consumers are
asked to assume more responsibility for deciding what benefit
package to buy and what treatment to obtain. All of these
choices rely on contracts to structure the financial relationship
between insurer and patient and to define the cost/benefit
trade-offs. However, if this shift in structure seeks to both
control costs and make individuals more comfortable with their
health plans, it may be expecting too much of contracts.
Managed care had to say "no" to patients to save costs
for unnecessary expenditures. This is, of course, precisely what
patients disliked. Consumer-choice plans shift responsibility
for cutbacks from the insurer to the consumer, taking the onus
off both the insurer and the employer. In effect, they ask the
consumer to say "no" to herself - exactly what many advocates
of market solutions to rising health care costs have
recommended.3' But will it work? Will consumers say no to
their future selves as patients? If so, will patients be willing to
abide by the choices they made as consumers?
Before addressing the question of efficacy, a few words
about terminology. New plans that give consumers more say or
responsibility in structuring plan elements have been called
"consumer-driven," "consumer-directed," and even "defined
37 See generally James C. Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost

Sharing in Health InsuranceBenefit Design, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar. 20, 2002, at W139,
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.139v1.pdf;
REGINA
E.
HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTHCARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA'S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 245-81 (1997).
38 Aetna Expands Product Line Offerings with Choice of Providers in 'Health

Fund,' 10 BNA HEALTH POLICY REPORT 956 (2002) [hereinafter Aetna Expands Product
Line].
Gabel et al., supra note 36, at W396 ("Managed care.
was placed in the
role of saying no to patients .... [Clonsumer-driven health care is an effort to put
patients in a position to say no to themselves").
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contribution" plans, although terms are not always used
consistently. For purposes of this Article, to distinguish
between the structure and financing of plans and also among
different plan structures, I lump all plans that give consumers
the right to buy medical care directly or to design their own
health benefit structures under the generic term "consumerchoice plans."
The term "defined contribution" has a more specific
meaning in the employee benefit world. It refers to an
employer's financial method or strategy for calculating how it
pays employee benefits.0 An employer with a defined
contribution plan pays a fixed or "defined" amount (in dollars
or percentage of wages, for example) toward employee benefits.
These dollars can be used to fund a self-funded plan under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),4' or to
purchase health insurance policies from insurance companies
or managed care organizations. Alternatively, the dollars can
be paid to an employee (or to a designated employee account,
like a medical savings account) so that the employee can use
the dollars to purchase benefits or services of his own choosing.
The employer discharges its obligation with this payment. The
employer does not guarantee any particular benefits or medical
care. Defined contribution plans contrast with defined benefit
plans, which guarantee employees a specific benefit or package
of benefits, for a fixed premium, regardless of what it costs to
provide those benefits in the future. Employers who fund their
own health plans (as in self-funded ERISA employee welfare
plans) must use their own assets to pay whatever the promised
benefits cost. Some defined contribution plans allow an
employee to use some or all of the contribution to purchase a
defined benefit health insurance policy, which offers some
guarantee of specific covered services, but in that case, the
responsibility for providing any guaranteed benefits lies with
the insurer or MCO. Some defined contribution plans function,

'0Paul Fronstin, Defined Contribution Health Benefits, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF,
No. 231, Mar. 2001 [hereinafter Fronstin, Defined Contribution Health Benefits]
(describing defined contribution plans for retirement and health benefits).
41 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
41 Jon R. Gabel & Gail A. Jensen, Self-Insurance in Times of Growing and
Retreating Managed Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 202, 205-06 (reporting
that most self-funded employer plans, especially those from small employers, rely on
indemnity insurance, although some large organizations have created managed care
plans).
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at least in part, like a medical savings account or like a 401(k)
retirement plan.
"Consumer-driven" or "consumer-directed" health plans
are characterized by consumer involvement in structuring plan
components, rather than by the way they are financed. There
are several models, just as there are many models of managed
care plans.4 3 An employee may use designated funds to buy
health care or to purchase the package of benefits with the
providers she prefers. Such plans are most often financed by
employer-defined contributions, a financing method that can
also be used by public entities.4
It is too early to say whether any of these consumerchoice plans are the wave of the future, a niche market
product, or a flash in the pan. As of 2001, an estimated 1.5
million Americans were members of some type of consumerchoice health plan.45 That represents 0.9 percent of all
Americans under age 65 in employment-based plans, and 0.6
percent of the total non-elderly population in the United
States.4 The number of companies that offer these plans to
employers remains limited, 7 and few employers have more
'

43
44

Fronstin, Defined ContributionHealth Benefits, supra note
40, at 11.
In theory, a consumer-driven plan could be financed like a defined
benefit

plan, but would not be attractive to sponsors who seek to limit their health care
expenditures, because it would encourage consumers to create an expensive package of
benefits using expensive providers.
45 Gabel et al., supra note 36, at W404 (noting that supporters'
predicteC
groundswell of enrollment has not materialized, but that enrollment has grown more
than skeptics predicted). See also Jon B. Christianson et al., Defined-Contribution
Health Insurance Products: Development and Prospects, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb.
2002, at 49.
46 Fronstin2002, supra
note 7.
47 Lumenos (Alexandria, Virginia), Definity Health (Minneapolis,
Minnesota),
and MyHealthBank (Portland, Oregon) offer health reimbursement-type plans. See
discussion infra Part IV.B. General descriptions of their plans are available at their
websites. See Lumenos,
Inc.,
at http://www.lumenos.com/Lumenos-Program
/At_aglance (last visited Jan. 30, 2004); Definity Health Corporation, at
http://www.definityhealth.conmarketing/productsServices.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2004);
MyHealthBank,
Inc.,
at
http://www.myhealthbank.com/corp/products/
unify.jsp?cat=pd (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
Vivius (Minneapolis, Minnesota) offers consumer-directed customized
packages. See discussion
infra Part
IV.C. See also Vivius
Inc.,
at
http://www.vivius.com/publicd consumers/index.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
Lumenos and Definity are not licensed as insurers to date, but instead,
administer self-funded employer plans, often taking a percentage of the monthly plan
premium as a fee for administration. Gabel et al., supra note 36, at W397. For example,
Definity takes ten percent. Zina Moukheiber, Give Them a Stake, FORBES MAGAZINE,
May 13, 2002, at 171. Vivius and MyHealthBank have licensing agreements with
HealthNet and Blue Cross/Blue Shield, respectively. Id. at W399.
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than one or two years of experience with them." Therefore, one
might argue that consumer-choice plans are a fad that need not
be taken seriously.
The contrary view is that regardless of their low
prevalence, consumer-choice plans may represent a shift in
thinking that could influence the structure and operation of all
health plans for the near future. Several large health insurance
companies are developing consumer-choice plans - an
indication that these companies consider consumer-choice
plans to be a potential competitive force in the future.9 Many
insurers and managed care companies have already
incorporated more consumer choice into the structure of their
managed care and insurance products. Even if consumer-choice
is not the dominant model, its effects may be significant. HMOs
- in the narrowest sense of closed panel organizations - remain
a minority organizational structure in the health benefits
market, but managed care issues drive the health policy debate
nevertheless. Thus, even if consumer-choice plans only attract
a minority of the population, their emphasis on consumer
participation in choosing and designing health plans may
reshape health insurance and the health policy debate in
general.'
4" Gabel et al. mention about 50 companies that offer consumer-directed
plans. Gabel et al., supra note 36.
49 Aetna, Humana, UnitedHealth Group, Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Tufts
Health Plan in Boston announced that they have or will create plans to meet the
competition. See Aetna Expands Product Line Offerings, supra note 38. Some industry
representatives predict that consumer-choice plans could occupy 20% of the market by
2005, and perhaps 50% by 2007. Gabel et al., supra note 36, at W405. That may be
optimistic. A similar prediction was made for Medicare managed care plans, but fewer
Medicare beneficiaries than expected moved into managed care plans and many plans
dropped out of the Medicare market. In 2003, only about 4.6 million of Medicare's 40
million beneficiaries were enrolled in Medicare managed care plans. Reed Abelson,
PrivatePlans Again Seen as Aid to Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2003, at Al.
50 Because most Americans get their health coverage through employment,
health insurance policy is often disproportionately targeted to and influenced by
employers and employees, as well as Medicare beneficiaries. Enron executives aside,
most employees and their dependents rely entirely on their health insurance to pay for
their medical care, because they cannot afford to pay out of pocket for non-nominal
care. This large population forms what Uwe Reinhardt called the middle tier of the
United States three-tiered health system. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Turning Our Gaze From
Bread and Circus Games, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Spring 1995, at 33, 34. The top tier
includes the wealthy who can afford to pay out of pocket for health care; the middle tier
includes employees, their dependents, and most Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries;
the bottom tier includes the uninsured and underinsured who depend on public
hospitals and clinics and free care pools and often go without basic and preventive care.
The large middle tier population includes the majority of voters, and when they are
squeezed, they complain, often to their legislators. Id.
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the

general

Consumer Choice Among Selected Plans "On Offer"

The simplest form of consumer-choice health plans are
cafeteria plans that have been in operation for many years.5 '
Employer-based plans give employees a choice of two or more
health plans (HMO, PPO, POS, or indemnity) offered by the
same or different insurers.2 Benefit plans for government
employees, like the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program (FEHBP)' and the California Public Employees
Retirement System (CalPERS),' offer government employees a
wide choice of plans offered by different companies, which can
encourage competition that may improve the price or quality of
plans, or both. A wide array of different plans is likely to be
attractive to consumers. Nonetheless, by itself, merely offering
a choice of plans does not guarantee significantly lower costs,
better quality or patient satisfaction. Premiums for most plans
are not dramatically different. Moreover, most of the plans on
offer are defined benefit plans, which do not give consumers
much say in directing their own health care. An employer can
control the cost of employee health benefits to some extent by
selecting the health plans on offer and by limiting the amount
or percentage of its contribution to premiums. Employers gain
the greatest financial advantage by using a defined
contribution to cap the cost of their premium payments.
B.

Health Reimbursement Arrangementsor Plans

The current prototypical consumer-choice plan gives
employees a fixed dollar amount (or percentage of wages) with
5, Fronstin, Defined ContributionHealth Benefits, supra
note 40.
52

Most employers offer plans sold by the same insurer or managed care

organization. Different plans offered by the same company may not actually produce
much difference among the choices. As Alain Enthoven points out, "they do not provide
the competition among delivery systems that motivates improvement" in quality or
cost. Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health InsuranceIs Failing:Now What?,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS,
May
28,
2003,
at
W3-237,
W3-240,
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.237v1.pdf.
5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (2000). For a general description of the program, see
Office of Personnel Management, at http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2004). The FEHBP covers about 8 million federal employees and their
dependents.
For a general description of the program, see CalPERS, at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/health/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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which to purchase health care directly from providers and/or
buy an insurance policy or managed care plan. The package
appears similar to a medical savings account plus a managed
care or indemnity (defined benefits) insurance policy. Often
referred to as a health reimbursement arrangement (HRA),
these plans have been granted favorable tax status by the
Internal Revenue Service, which may encourage employers to
adopt them.'
Since HRAs are relatively new, only a small proportion
of employers offer them. However, several national insurance
companies, including Aetna and some Blue Cross/Blue Shield
organizations, are developing HRA plans.' Although there is no
uniform structure for HRAs, which are still evolving, existing
plans follow a general template of two or three tiers like the
structure shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Health Reimbursement Arrangements
Employer Contribution
Cash Account
(e.g. $1,500)
Out of Pocket Deductible
(e.g. $2,000)

F

Defined Benefits

In the top tier, an employer contributes a fixed dollar
amount, perhaps one or two thousand dollars, to each
employee's designated medical savings account, which the
employee can use to purchase medical care from anyone. 7 Some
plans place restrictions on the type of services an employee can
purchase with these "banked" account funds. For example,
5 The IRS ruled that this employer contribution is not taxable if paid solely
by the employer and not taken from an employee's salary, and is used for substantiated
medical payments including premium payments. Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-28 I.R.B. 75.
5
See Gabel et al., supra note 36, at 399.
57 In this discussion, in the case of employees who purchase coverage for their
families, the term "employee" includes covered dependents who select specific medical
services for themselves.
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some plans might limit purchases to particular types of care
and prescription drugs. Others might prohibit expenditures for
cosmetic surgery or custodial care. Most plans permit
employees to choose any provider in order to maintain the
advantage of consumer choice. However, employers may
contract with provider groups to offer discounted fees to
employees, so that employees who use these providers will
spend a smaller proportion of their account funds. In order to
encourage employees to remain healthy, more generous plans
may permit
expenditures
for preventive
care, like
immunizations, well-baby care, and smoking cessation or
fitness programs, without counting them as account
expenditures. Some plans may allow unexpended account
funds to roll over to subsequent years.
When the initial "banked" amount has been expended,
plans often require employees to pay out of pocket - up to a
maximum amount, such as two thousand dollars - for
subsequent medical care. Not all plans have this middle tier,
however. Those that do could structure it in different ways,
such as a co-payment for additional contributions by
employers. This tier may also contain restrictions on the type of
services that would qualify as middle tier expenditures.
Once the maximum has been paid by or on behalf of the
employee, remaining medical expenses are financed through
some form of health insurance, typically a defined benefit plan
- the third or final tier. In these cases, the initial and middle
tiers function as a deductible. The employer may purchase a
managed care plan or indemnity policy for the employee group,
with a package of defined benefits. In a self-funded plan, the
employer may begin paying directly for medical care, with or
without a cap on per capita or total expenditures.
Alternatively, the employer may provide the employee with a
fixed contribution that the employee can use to buy a health
insurance policy or membership in a managed care plan. To
negotiate lower premiums than would be available for
individual policies, the employer or HRA plan ordinarily
creates a benefit plan or selects the choice of plans from which
an employee can choose. This third tier offers something like
catastrophic coverage, and may appear in the same variety of
plan structures that exist for regular group insurance plans.
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In view of the possible variations in each tier, no single
description will capture the details of every HRA.'
Nonetheless, the general structure has two characteristic
attributes: cash or its equivalent goes to the employee to buy
medical care, and some form of health insurance benefit plan
covers medical care expenses above a certain minimum.
Consumer-DirectedPlans

C.

Consumer-directed or consumer-driven plans offer the
most consumer involvement in structuring health benefits.
Consumers design their own customized health plans by
selecting its components - provider network, benefit package,
cost-sharing requirements, conditions and limitations - from
choices offered by a commercial company or employer." Figure
3 illustrates categories of options, which can be varied in many
ways, with consumers choosing differently priced components
in each category:
Figure 3: Consumer-Directed Plan
PREMIUM
LvL

$$$

CONSUMER-CUSTOMIZED PLAN COMPONENTS
Other
Cost
Physician Hospital IBenefit
ILimits
Network INetwork PcaeISharing
Open

Open

Broad

Low

Few

Medium $$

PPO

PPO

Average

Medium

Average

Low $

Closed Panel Fixed

High

+

Limited

ff

I

Many

High

.

+

+

+

=$ Total
Premium

Ideally, there should be several options for each
component. For example, provider options might include the
58 The Pacific Business Group on Health (PBGH) partnered with Definity to
offer what it calls the Breakthrough Plan and received "a small share" of Definity stock
in return. See Pacific Business Group on Health, Breakthrough Strategy - Promoting
at
Care
Delivery,
of
Health
and Reengineering
Consumer Choice
http://www.pbgh.org/programs/breakthrough (last visited Jan. 31, 2004). PBGH states
that the plan is not managed care and it is not a defined contribution plan, yet the
description suggests it may be both. See News Release, Definity Health, Pacific
Business Group on Health Unveils Groundbreaking Alternative to Managed Care,
available at http://www.definityhealth.com/marketing/newsroom/pressreleases/2001/
BreakthroughRelease-l1052001.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
59 Companies that have created and offer consumer customized packages
include Vivius and MyHealthBank. See supra note 47.
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choice of any physician, a fixed network of physicians, or a
physician network with the possibility of referral outside the
network. Each of these options is priced separately, with
greater freedom of choice and more generous benefits generally
priced higher. A premium is calculated based on the total cost
of the components. Employees who find that their choices yield
a premium that is unacceptably high will have to select less
expensive components.
These plans are designed to - and do - force the
consumer to face the cost of health care choices in far more
detail than is possible when the choice is among health plans
as a whole. Consumer-directed plans are most often financed
by defined contributions, although they need not be. A fixed
contribution forces the consumer to make explicit trade-offs
between the premium amount and the scope of services
covered, freedom to choose physicians and hospitals, provider
locations, the size of deductibles and co-payments, dispute
resolution procedures, and other plan elements. For example, a
consumer who wishes to use a teaching hospital, because it
offers a higher quality of care, might have to pay a higher
premium or a large co-payment.
V.

A.

IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER-CHOICE HEALTH PLANS

Advantages for Employers

The most obvious advantage that consumer-choice plans
offer employers is cost savings.' However, this advantage
primarily derives from financing the plan with defined
contributions, which caps the cost of benefits and protects the
employer from rising medical costs. It may also reduce the cost
and burden of administering a health benefits plan, although
any savings will depend on the employer's previous experience
with plan administration or how much outside companies
charge to administer self-funded plans.
Consumer-directed plans also shift some, if not all, of
the financial and personal risk to employees. Since consumers
decide what medical care to buy - at least in the first two tiers
- they assume responsibility for how much to spend, what
provider to use, and what kind of care they obtain. This
Alan Lyles, Jonathan P. Weiner, Andrew D. Shore, Jon Christianson, Leif
I. Solberg & Patricia Drury, Cost and Quality Trends in Direct Contracting
Arrangements, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 89.
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responsibility carries with it an implicit assumption of the risk
of error, so that consumer-employees are less able or likely to
complain to employers about their choices or unfortunate
outcomes of treatment. By the same token, it distances the
employer from decisions about benefit coverage and liability for
negligence or wrongdoing on the part of providers or plan
administrators.
B.

Advantages and Disadvantagesfor Consumers

Consumer-choice plans should appeal to consumers. A
consumer-choice plan company homepage features as its
slogan: "Whoever holds the money writes the rules. With
Lumenos, health care consumers hold the money."" This is a
clear statement that health benefits are a consumer good and
that purchasing power determines one's health benefits. It also
emphasizes the idea of consumer choice as the foundation for
medical care, appealing to the American passion for choice in
general and consumer choice in particular.62
An HRA offers consumers considerable freedom of
choice in the first two plan tiers. Individuals can shop for
physicians and services without the constraints imposed by a
gatekeeper system. Most people would appreciate saving the
time and bypassing the bureaucracy of obtaining referrals to
specialists, for example.' The ability simply to make an
appointment with any physician one likes for routine
procedures, like a mammogram or a wart removal, would
remove some of the aggravation associated with managed care.
Freedom of choice also provides some measure of
control. Consumer-directed plans give consumers more control
over the kinds of services included in their insurance coverage.
Ideally, consumers could put together a package of services
tailored to their own needs and preferences. An insurer's
ability to construct flexible packages at a reasonable premium
61

See Lumenos, Inc., The Lumenos Program, at http://www.lumenos.com/

LumenosProgram/At-a-glance (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
62 ANNAS, supra note 4.
Some managed care plans have all but eliminated the requirement of
preauthorization for referrals after finding that preauthorization produced little, if any,
cost savings. For example, UnitedHealthcare abandoned its program requiring
preauthorization of certain specialty care in 1999. See News Release, UnitedHealth
Group, UnitedHealthcare Introduces Care Coordination (Nov. 9, 1999), available at
http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/news/re1l999/1109ccoord.htm.
Similar prerequisites to care in network managed care plans may be on the
wane. See Robinson, supra note 37, at W143.
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may be limited, however, since the premium reflects the size
and risk profile of the entire consumer pool for that coverage
scheme. And, as noted above, consumers assume responsibility
for the care they purchase directly, as opposed to care selected
and provided by a managed care organization, a responsibility
that flows from and counterbalances the gain in control.
For consumers, the benefits of freedom of choice and
increased control are contingent and in some instances
unavailable. Whether consumer-choice plans actually expand
consumers' choices depends upon the type of plan offered. If the
plan supplements a menu of health plans offered by an
employer, it may increase employees' options. If the plan
replaces another plan that the employer would otherwise offer,
the effect on choice depends on the content of the old and new
options. Employment-based plans still give the employer the
ultimate say in which choices are available. There is some
evidence that the majority of employers pay more attention to
the cost of premiums than to the quality of care or the
operation of health plans.' As Marc Pauly and Marc Berger
point out, employment-based plans necessarily cater to the
average employee - especially the average employee who is
more likely to change employment when unhappy - and may
ignore the concerns and preferences of employees who have
little bargaining power.' This focus on the average mobile
employee typically results in considerable uniformity of health
plans, so that employees are forced to accept conditions they do
not like in order to obtain more important benefits they want.
Consumer-choice plans should be attractive to people
who are relatively healthy or free from chronic diseases or
conditions that require expensive, ongoing treatment. They
may also appeal to people who need specialized treatment that
does not cost very much per unit, such as asthma medication,
which rarely exceeds the first tier of banked funds in an HRA.
Those types of consumers can avoid seeing a primary care
provider to get a referral each time they need a prescription
64 JON R. GABEL, KELLY A. HUNT & KIMBERLY HURST,
WHEN EMPLOYERS

CHOOSE

HEALTH

PLANS

Do

NCQA ACCREDITATION

AND

HEDIS DATA

COUNT?

(Commonwealth Fund, Sept. 1998) (reporting that employers vary in their knowledge
of health plans and whether they emphasize premium price, quality, provider networks
or
other
factors
in
selecting
plans
for
employees),
available at
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/health-care/gabelncqa hedis_293.asp.
65 Mark Pauly & Marc L. Berger, Why Should Managed Care
Be Regulated?,
in REGULATING MANAGED CARE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND FUTURE OPTIONS 53 (Stuart
H. Altman et al. eds., 1999).
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refilled. Similarly, parents can schedule a well-child visit with
little fuss. However, people with more expensive problems, like
chronic illnesses, who can expect to spend the full amount of
any banked account and/or deductible, may find these plans
more expensive than an ordinary defined health benefits
insurance policy. Accordingly, they may be unable to assemble
an affordable package of benefits that covers their needs.
Additionally, consumers face high and even prohibitive
information costs regarding consumer-choice plans. In order to
decide what she wants in a consumer-choice health plan, a
consumer needs better-than-average knowledge of health
benefits and plan structures, as well as how to read and
interpret a contract, and access and analyze health
information.'
Many companies post information about
consumer-choice plans on their websites, enabling consumers
to navigate an interactive program to assemble and compare
different plan components. Using the website requires some
familiarity with computer-based information systems. 7 Both
defined contribution plans and consumer-choice plans are
probably most attractive to young, computer-literate people
who like managing their own affairs. It is not surprising,
therefore, that small start-up firms, especially software
companies, were among the first to offer them. People who do
not have access to a computer, cannot manipulate
computerized information systems, or lack the sophistication to
understand the complexities of health plan structures, face a
difficult time availing themselves of consumer-choice plans.
C.

Advantages and Disadvantagesfor Patients

Publicly available information about consumer-choice
health plans emphasizes consumer issues, largely to the
exclusion of patient-related concerns, such as how patients are
treated. Most of the information that companies publicly offer
focuses on initial entry issues, such as the freedom to select
plan components in a consumer-driven plan, or spend banked
first tier amounts in an HRA. Information about how to get
66 See Vitt et al., supra note 6 (discussing research finding that while some

consumers may be ready to make more choices, others have little understanding of
their health benefits, with some not knowing what type of plan covers them; and that
the different health plan options may be "incomprehensible to the estimated 42-90
million Americans with low functional literacy").
67 See Gabel et al., supra note 36, at W401.
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medical care that cannot be purchased with banked or out-ofpocket funds is harder to find. It appears that all types of
consumer-choice plans rely on some form of defined benefits
insurance for medical care beyond a minimum threshold,
whether it be an ordinary deductible or an HRA tier. Indeed,
Alain Enthoven has dismissed consumer-choice plans as a
euphemism for ordinary health insurance with a high
deductible.'
Some consumer-choice plans could produce an
inefficient allocation of resources, paying for the kind of care
that individuals could most easily afford without insurance and
limiting insurance coverage to fewer costly services. For
example, employers might spend a larger proportion of their
total health benefits funds for the medical savings account
segment in the first tier, leaving less with which to buy the
residual health insurance coverage. This would disadvantage
individuals with more serious conditions or more expensive
care needs.69 In this case, patients who need significant medical
care are likely to be worse off than with either indemnity
insurance or managed care of almost any type. "[A] small
fraction of the population accounts for a large share of health
spending .

.

.

. Overall, the top 10 percent of spenders

accounted for 58 percent of all health care spending."" Thus,
while the majority of employees might be satisfied with
suffer
plans,
a
minority
might
consumer-choice
disproportionately. It is patients, rather than consumers, who
confront the high costs for catastrophic care, and it is in these
circumstances that patients most resist limits on care.
Once the consumer becomes a patient who needs more
than inexpensive out-patient care, she faces the same question
of benefit coverage that has bedeviled both indemnity
insurance and managed care: does the plan cover the care that
she needs? The question may be postponed, but not necessarily
avoided. Ultimately, therefore, consumer-choice plans are
68 See Enthoven, supra note 52, at W3-239 ("The popular 'consumer-driven' or
'defined-contribution' models are no more than a cover for high deductibles, intended to
make consumers cost-conscious shoppers. They offer no real solution, because health
expenses are concentrated among high-cost patients whose personal expenses exceed
deductibles.").
See Catherine Hoffman, Dorothy Rice & Hai-Yen Sung, Persons with
Chronic Conditions: Their Prevalence and Costs, 276 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1473 (1996)
(reporting that 76% of direct medical care costs in the U.S. are for chronic conditions).
70 Paul Fronstin, Can "Consumerism" Slow the Rate of Health Benefit Cost
Increases?, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, No. 247, July 2002.
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likely to run into the same wall that damaged their
predecessors. If consumer-choice plans include defined-benefits
health insurance, then they will appeal only to healthy people
who like to pick their physicians for preventive and routine
care. More importantly, they will not solve the intractable
problem of disputes over coverage of expensive treatment.
From the patient's perspective, the health policy debate will
have turned back on itself, into a contract dispute once again.
D.

Implications for Health Policy and Regulation

Consumer-choice health plans encourage thinking about
health care as a consumer good, rather than a personal service.
This characterization may encourage consumers to learn more
about health care in order to make good "purchases." To the
extent that the public becomes more familiar with the
possibilities and limits of medicine, and the qualifications of
providers, society may benefit from more realistic public
expectations."
The proliferation of consumer-choice plans may also
encourage providers to compete more vigorously for patients on
the basis of quality as well as price. While some of this
competition may improve the general quality of care, it may
also divert dollars from some essential medical facilities to
boutique medical practices for the carriage trade. In addition,
consumers who are paying their own bills may demand more of
providers, insisting on diagnostic tests and health-enhancing
procedures that drive up the cost of health care. After all, if
medical care is just another consumer good, consumers may
feel entitled to buy whatever they can afford, regardless of
personal need or a physician's judgment.
Not everyone can extensively research medical care, and
bad buys in medicine can have serious negative consequences.
As discussed in Part V below, it is difficult for anyone to predict
the kind of care she might need in the future and, therefore, to
make accurate choices about what kind of health plan is worth
buying. If consumers are expected to make these choices and
See, e.g., CALLAHAN, supra note 2. There is a growing amount
of
information available to consumers on the Internet, including medical information
about diseases and treatment from the National Institutes of Health and non-profit
organizations advocating for patients with specific diseases and conditions, and
information about physicians from state medical boards and about hospitals and
managed care organizations from accrediting organizations.
71
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accept responsibility for them, then they may require
considerable assistance. Consumer protection legislation
imposing broad disclosure duties on providers and insurers
would be most apt for a consumer model, but generic
disclosures may not be sufficient to answer questions from the
patient's perspective.
Consumer-choice plans also may affect the patientdoctor relationship. To some extent, managed care already has
altered the way patients think about physicians and other
health professionals. Many patients have expressed fears that
physicians would be persuaded or forced to deny them needed
treatment because of their financial arrangements with
managed care organizations, especially capitated payment
arrangements.72 A consumer-choice plan that insulates
physicians from an insurer's financial influence might restore
trust in the physician-patient relationship.72 A patient who
buys care directly from a physician - without the need to seek
insurer approval - is likely to have confidence that the
physician will advise the patient about all available
treatments. This gives physicians freedom to make treatment
decisions solely in the interests of their patients. It also leaves
responsibility for those decisions, including liability for
malpractice, with the physician alone, without implicating
insurers or employers.
The behavior of consumers and patients will influence
the effect of consumer-choice health plans on national health
care expenditures. Consumer-choice health plans may force
consumers to recognize the costs of their health care, as
intended. In theory, consumers may respond by choosing lower
cost care, which would lower overall health costs. However, if
people forego needed care because of cost, their problems may
simply be delayed or exacerbated, affecting their lives and
possibly requiring more expensive care in the future.
Depending upon the structure of the plan, costs will be shifted
" Patients have brought actions against managed care organizations
claiming that their compensation arrangements with physicians created incentives to
deny necessary care to patients. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 914 (1997). The decision in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.
211 (2002), may have foreclosed many future claims.
73 Incentive-neutral payment systems are difficult to design. See Stephen R.
Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. &
MED. 240 (1996) (describing variables in physicians' organizational structure and
compensation elements such as amount, timing, and intensity that create and
counteract incentives to offer treatment).
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to consumers or among groups of consumers. Costs that are not
covered by the plan could also affect the public fisc if the
government becomes the payer of last resort. This could drive
health care costs higher because at least some of these last
resort costs would be additions to, rather than substitutes for,
private health plan expenditures.
Consumer-choice plans might encourage fragmentation
of risk pools, which could have serious negative consequences
for those pools with the sickest patients.74 If healthier people
enroll in consumer-choice plans, competing health insurance
and managed care will have a higher proportion of sicker
individuals in their insured populations. This adverse selection
can initiate an insurance death spiral. Insurers or plans with
higher-risk populations charge higher premiums, which drive
healthier individuals out and into competing, lower-premium
plans."5 The cycle continues until the higher-risk individuals
cannot afford actuarially adequate premiums and insurers or
plans collapse. Here again, the government may pick up the
remnants, either because they become eligible for public
programs like Medicaid, or by expanding government benefit
programs or creating high-risk insurance pools.
Consumer-choice plans may also alter how health
insurance is distributed. To the extent that consumers have a
direct insurer-insured relationship with a health plan they
choose, the health plan should be more directly accountable to
the insured. This could uncouple health benefits from
employment." Employers may find that their role in organizing
and administering benefits is sufficiently reduced to encourage
them to abandon it entirely, leaving employees to deal directly
with plans.
Severing the link between employment and health
benefits may not be financially attractive to employers,
however. They may save labor costs by offering health benefits
instead of higher wages.7 Employers may perceive other
74
75
76

See Robinson, supra note 37, at W151.
See, e.g., Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 20, § 144:7.
For a critique of current employment-based health insurance, see Uwe E.

Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health Insurance: RIP, in THE FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM: WHO WILL CARE FOR THE POOR AND UNINSURED? 325-52 (Stuart A. Altman et
al. eds., 1997).
77 See Alan B. Krueger & Uwe E. Reinhardt, The
Economics of Employer
Versus Individual Mandates, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Spring 1994 Supplement, at 34
(arguing that health insurance costs come out of employee wages), at
http://content.healthaffairs.orgcgi/ eprint/13/2/34.pdf.
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advantages of controlling health plans, including ensuring that
their employees are covered for illnesses that affect
productivity."8 From the employee's perspective, there are
advantages to having an employer act as broker for health
insurance." Employers have resources to analyze plan
characteristics, such as quality and price, synthesize
information, and present it in a comprehensible format for
employees. Even more importantly, large employers have
bargaining power to negotiate lower premiums than are
available for individual policies. Insurers favor "natural
groups" - those formed for reasons unrelated to health risks because the population avoids adverse selection. Groups
formed as a result of employment are good natural groups,
which can qualify for lower premiums. In addition, insurers
save on the costs of marketing, because they need only
negotiate with the employer, not with each individual
employee.'
78 Ellen O'Brien, Employers' Benefits from Workers' Health Insurance, 81

MILBANK Q. 5 (2003) (arguing that health economists often do not consider and rarely
evaluate firms' returns stemming from health-related investments and suggesting that
health benefits may benefit employers by improving recruitment and retention of
highly competent employees and increasing productivity, in addition to reducing
absenteeism).
79 Paul Fronstin & Ruth Helman, Findings From the 2000 Health Confidence
Survey, 22 EBRI Notes 1 (April 2001) (noting that some employees appreciate their
employer's ability to negotiate from a position of strength). On the other hand, not all
employers are effective agents for their employees. See Mariner, supra note 34.
Enthoven argues that the employer-based system of health insurance is failing and
recommends a revival of managed competition, by which he means real competition
among insurance carriers, to control rising costs. See Enthoven, supra note 52, at W3237. He says this requires employers to give their employees a real choice among plans
having different provider groups, which are offered by different insurance carriers or
companies. Id. at W3-243. Enthoven's proposal would require regulating insurance
carriers to prevent them from selecting risks, but allow them to price according to the
risk of enrollees. Id. at W3-243 to 244. Exchanges would act as brokers that bring
together employers and carriers so a large enough pool of employees can choose a plan.
The exchange would adjust premiums for risk after enrollment and sets common rules
for all. Id. at W3-244. His recommendation for exchanges sounds a lot like the Clinton
health plan, except that it would be voluntary (but probably require some amendment
of ERISA and state insurance law). It assumes that employees will choose voluntarily
and carriers can actually compete for their choice. Since the exchange itself has
expenses and profit, it is not clear how much of this would merely replace current
carrier expenses and how much would be an addition. Employers may resist this array
of choices if it is easier to deal with only one or two carriers. Many self-insure and don't
want to buy policies, or do not want to pay premiums based on a population that
includes people in addition to their own employees because such "outsiders" may have
more health risks and raise premiums, although it is possible to risk-adjust premiums
so that employers pay only for their own employees.
go Consumer-choice plans may forfeit some savings in marketing costs if they
engage in direct-to-consumer marketing or plan development.
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If health benefits were separated from employment, a
new set of issues would arise. The first would be whether to
depend on insurers issuing individual policies or to encourage
or require the formation of groups of prospective insureds. In
the absence of rate control, of course, non-group insurance
would ordinarily produce higher premiums, thereby defeating
much of the purpose of consumer-choice plans, that is, to save
money for both consumers and the nation as a whole.
Alternatively, insurers could offer fewer benefits for the same
premiums, probably disappointing consumers and patients.
Whether employers would abandon their sponsorship of
health benefits to the government or even to privately insured
groups is hard to predict. Fragmented risk pools appear to
destroy one advantage of employment-based insurance groups.
However, employers might prefer to continue sponsoring health
benefit plans, while reducing benefits and shifting more costs
to employees, rather than paying additional wages to permit
employees to buy into external plans." Currently, there does
not appear to be much support among employers or benefit
managers for decoupling health insurance from employment,
but the change could occur if a critical mass of employees opted
for consumer-choice plans and made their own choices
independent of their employer."
Such a shift would return a large proportion of the
population to the status it had before the rise of employmentbased health insurance and the adoption of Medicare and
Medicaid. It also would require a sea change in insurance
regulation to govern millions of individuals, many of whom
could not afford individual health insurance policies. A move
toward individual policies could set the stage for expanded
regulation of insurance to create large enough risk pools 81 There might be a role for employers in offering marketing or information

about plans offered by independent insurers. Some employers provide this service to
employees without creating an ERISA benefit plan, but there appears to be little
interest in paying workers higher wages to enable them to buy health insurance in the
commercial market. The tax benefits of having an ERISA plan with benefits that count
as employee compensation are likely to remain an incentive for employers to retain
control over employee benefits. Moreover, employer-sponsored plans may be favored as
one means of encouraging employees to remain with the employer. See HERZLINGER,
supra note 37, at 250-52.
82 Gabel et al., supra note 36 (reporting results
of survey on benefit
managers, insurers, health plan managers and benefit consultants that no one was
seriously considering terminating their health plans or giving employees a fixed
amount with which to purchase insurance independent of employment; also noting that
the survey respondents may have an interest in employers remaining in the field).
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independent of employment - to avoid adverse selection and to
permit reasonable group rate premiums.' This might also
accelerate other insurance reforms, such as regulating
marketing practices, mandatory benefit coverage, nondiscrimination requirements, standards for dispute resolution,
standards of care, and even requirements for the governance of
insurance companies and rate regulation to ensure fair
premiums. Alternatively, it might encourage broader health
policy reforms, such as expanding Medicare to include the nonelderly.
VI. WILL PATIENTS
PLANS?

ACCEPT

CONSUMER-CHOICE

HEALTH

Despite past failures, current consumer-choice proposals
seek to harness market features to control costs, perhaps to
return health care to its nineteenth and early twentieth
century status as a consumer good. The proposals offer options
to consumers in the hope that consumers will make choices
that result in lower total health care spending. In turn, the
model shifts responsibility for controlling costs - and increased
financial risk - from private sector organizations to the
consumer herself. The success of consumer-choice models thus
depends on the validity of two assumptions for which there is
little empirical evidence. First, it assumes that the choices
consumers make will be cost effective. Second, it assumes that
consumers can and will make ex ante choices to which they will
adhere without regret when they become patients.' Both
assumptions depend upon the ability and willingness of
individuals to abide by contractual limitations on their future
access to medical care. This part critically examines these
assumptions and their underpinnings.
Americans value choice - both as a general principle
and as applied to medical care.' Indeed, public demand for
choice induced many MCOs to offer POS and other plans that
allow consumers to choose from among a larger group of
Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and
Risk Classification (Working Paper, June 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.taf?abstract id+322581.
Enthoven, supra note 52, at W3-238 ("Any successful cost containment
strategy must give doctors and patients good personal reasons to limit spending.").
85 See generally KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS
2003 ANNUAL SURVEY, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/ehbs2003-1-set.cfm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004); ANNAS, supra note 4.
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providers.' However, expanded choice within a health plan can
be costly. MCOs lost bargaining power by contracting with
many providers, so that POS and expanded-choice plans cost
more than restricted-network HMOs. The idea that consumers
would choose the least costly provider seems counterintuitive,
especially in the United States, where people often associate
price with quality. Indeed, consumers are most likely to
associate the concept of choice with choice of physicians, not
with a choice of health plans.87
Choosing providers may not prove to be the most
important determinant of health care costs. For example, it
may be the number of transplants performed, not whether the
transplant costs $300,000 when performed by Dr. A at Hospital
B or $400,000 when performed by Dr. C at Hospital D, that
drives up health care costs. In that case, whether the
transplant is covered at all has more influence on total costs
than who performs the transplant. If this is true, then the
scope of covered benefits should be the most important element
of a health plan. Yet, consumers may not recognize a future
need for transplant coverage and therefore may purchase a
cheaper plan without such coverage. When the transplant is
needed, the consumer is now a patient and may resist
enforcement of any contract that denies coverage. Thus, opting
for a less costly plan does not mean that a patient will abide by
it without challenge, thus undoing much of the expected costsaving.
The consumer-choice model rejects a "one size fits all"
approach to health insurance, encouraging different sizes or
packages of benefits, providers, and prices so that consumers
can choose among them. It is possible, however, that for the
costly services of greatest concern to patients, one size does fit
most, if not all. Most people appear to want generally the same
thing - good quality care for whatever serious, expensive
illness befalls them. Therefore, a major challenge to the success
of consumer-choice models is the fact that consumers choose
health plans, while patients choose medical care. Thus,
contracts for health benefits must describe precisely what
medical care will be included in covered benefits to permit
consumers to accurately purchase a health plan for their future
selves as patients. Moreover, consumers must be able and
In some cities, almost all physicians participate in all health plans.
8' See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 85.
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willing to predict what their future needs will be and choose
accordingly.
One school of thought argues that the public should
have access to enough information about a health plan to
permit informed choices.' This is a consumer-oriented remedy
for imbalances in information. The information could be
provided by the health plans themselves, employers who offer
them, government agencies, or independent non-government
organizations.89 The public already has access to considerable
information. Most health plans distribute information
brochures to prospective consumers and make information
available on their websites. Employers, as well as independent
organizations, offer summary comparisons of the most salient
features of selected plans.'
It is not clear, however, that the type of information
disclosure currently required or voluntarily provided either
meets consumers' needs or encourages cost-saving choices.' In
particular, it is not clear that information disclosure, no matter
how complete, can prevent disputes over benefit coverage when
a patient needs care. After all, it is almost impossible to
describe the specific types of diagnostic procedures and
treatments that will be covered in the case of all types of
illnesses and injuries. Aside from the infinite variability of
88

William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and

American Healthcare,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999). Most state licensure laws have
been modified in recent years to expand disclosure requirements. Id.
89 Several organizations offer descriptions of different plans. See, e.g.,
California Choice Health Insurance (company offering private employers a choice of 6
different health plans types), at http://www.calchoice.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
90 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) requires
employment-based plans to give employees a summary of information about the health
plan, although the required information falls short of the kind of operational detail
recommended by consumer advocates or required by state laws governing non-ERISA
insurance plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1022 (2000).
9' See Sage, supra note 88; Rodwin, supra note 33. Even report card systems
purporting to compare the quality of care provided by different plans may not offer the
information that consumers want to know. See, e.g., Huw T.O. Davies, A. Eugene
Washington & Andrew B. Bindman, Health Care Report Cards: Implications for
Vulnerable Patient Groups and the OrganizationsProviding Them Care, 27 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & LAW 379 (2002). See also MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE:
THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM (2002). "Disclosure systems have been systematically
oversold" as a method of helping people reduce health risks or make safe purchases. Id.
at 157. Graham argues that, despite their theoretical value, useful disclosure systems
are difficult to design. Id. at 153-55. She points out that disclosure requirements "to
reduce risks have been products of expediency and frustration." Id. at 11. In disputes
over whether or how to regulate risks, disclosure has been a political compromise
solution that avoids complete corporate transparency and traditional governmentally
imposed product standards. Id.
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human beings, which requires tailoring medical treatment
recommendations to individuals, advances in medical
technology continue to add options for future diagnosis and
treatment, while medical and health services research and
evaluate the effectiveness of old and new techniques. A
complete catalog of covered services would fill a multi-volume
compendium.' Even if such a catalog were available, it is not
clear whether consumers would be able to select the treatment
options - or even medical conditions - that they want or need
to be covered, because that requires predicting one's future
medical needs. 3 This type of projection is notoriously difficult to
do even with the best information. Moreover, there may be a
significant population that is not inclined to attempt it.'
Consumer-choice proposals are predicated on the
assumption consumers can decide, ex ante - when they must
choose a health plan during an annual enrollment period which plan they will want when they need care in the future.
In principle, this type of forward-looking decision making is no
different from any personal services contract in which a
9' Some boundaries are necessarily imposed by one-year health plan terms,
which limit the time within which future technologies might become available and,
therefore, the scope of coverage. In addition, most health plans exclude coverage of
experimental or investigational therapies, although whether these exclusions ought to
apply in an individual case is a frequent subject of dispute. See, e.g., Turner v. Fallon
Community Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1072
(1998); Loyola University of Chicago v. Humana Insurance Co., 996 F.2d 895 (7th Cir.
1993).
, People with chronic diseases are certainly aware of coverage categories
or
treatments, and often physicians, that they wish to have covered. However, they may
in fact have less freedom of choice if the desired coverage is beyond their means.
Genetic testing may also help some people predict their risks of some future illnesses,
but may also subject them to other disadvantages, from increased insurance premiums
to employment discrimination. See generally Alexandra K Glazier, Genetic
Predispositions,Prophylactic Treatments and Private Health Insurance: Nothing is
Better Than a Good Pair of Genes, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 45 (1997); GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA (Mark Rothstein ed.,
1997); NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, GENETIC TESTING AND
SCREENING IN THE AGE OF GENOMIC MEDICINE (2000); ASSESSING GENETIC RISK:

IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
94 A significant number of people do not designate a health
care proxy or
surrogate decision-maker to act in case of their future incompetence, despite surveys
indicating support for such options as well as concern that patients' wishes are too
often ignored. A Controlled Trial to Improve Care of Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients:
The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preference Outcomes and Risks of Treatments
(SUPPORT),274 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1877 (1998). Although securing treatment for lifethreatening illnesses is among the foremost concerns of health insurance, there may be
psychological reasons for avoiding discussions of one's future terminal illness or death,
which might not apply when making decisions about the probability of future illness or
injury that is not life-threatening. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, APPROACHING
DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE (1997).
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consumer contracts for personal services in the future. 5
However, the consequences of an error in prediction about one's
need for medical care are often far more serious than an error
in predicting one's future need for furnace repairs or even legal
services.
Additionally, a person's preferences can change. What a
consumer wants, or can currently afford, may not suffice when
that consumer becomes a patient. The problem of inconsistent
preferences across time appears to be particularly troubling in
health insurance.' The consumer who chooses a less costly
health plan today may believe that her future self will be
satisfied with a limited range of benefits or providers, or that
she will have enough money to pay for any health care not
covered by the plan. When the future arrives, however, she
may not be satisfied in fact and may not have the money after
all.
Contracts are a way of binding oneself to behave more
rationally or ideally in the future. Indeed, more traditional
health economists and contract proponents advocate contracts
as a way to force consumers to make binding economic choices.
Unlike personal decisions about one's own behavior or promises
to oneself, however, which one can abandon unilaterally, an
insurer can enforce a bilateral contract against the insured.
Such contracts could be considered a form of an Odysseus
contract, in which one asks another to prevent them from
succumbing to their own future desires. But while Odysseus
may have been genuinely grateful for being restrained from
embracing the sirens, will patients who elect limited benefit
coverage be grateful for the money they saved last year when

95 Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract
Today to Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755 (1992).
For example, one behavioral economics approach contrasts the choices that
one makes today with the choices that he makes for the future or his "future self." See,
e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER & BOTOND KOSZEGI, A THEORY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
OF ADDICTIVE BADS: OPTIMAL TAX LEVELS AND TAX INCIDENCE FOR CIGARETTE EXCISE

TAXATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8777, Feb. 2002). These
"time-inconsistent" preferences represent what a person "would like for himself today
and what he would like for himself tomorrow," which are often quite different. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Gruber, Government Policy Towards Smoking: A View from Economics, 3
YALE J. HEALTH POLY L. & ETHICS 119, 122 (2002) (arguing that people often choose
pleasure over risk avoidance today in the belief that, in the future, they will be more
forbearing and choose to stop taking risks, like smoking or overeating; but that people
who claim or believe they will quit smoking (or start dieting) in the future often find
that tomorrow never comes, because every day, one's future forbearing self becomes
today's pleasure-seeking self).
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treatment that may save their lives is denied this year because
it is not a covered benefit?
Characterizing patients as consumers may increase
demand for health care. Since the collapse of the Clinton
administration's proposal for universal coverage, medical care
and health insurance have been described as products - and
patients as consumers. Consumers are entitled to buy whatever
they want to the extent of their financial resources. Contracts
can, at best, control supply. They cannot control demand. The
problem of demand for medical care - and therefore resistance
to contractual limits - seems insoluble, especially in a private
market that encourages consumer choice. 7 Paradoxically, the
more people think of medical care and health insurance as a
consumer good or a matter of contract, the more care they may
demand. This can also erode any sense of social responsibility
for protecting everyone from devastating illness. Examples of
this erosion can be seen in the rise of "boutique" medicine,
which offers "consumer choice" of medical services," while state
Medicaid programs have insufficient funding to cover necessary
expenses for people in need.'
The foregoing examination suggests that disputes over
defined benefits cannot be prevented unless health plans define
and enforce limits in a way that is acceptable to patients as
well as consumers. This puts a heavy burden on those who
design and interpret health plan benefits, a burden that has
not been met so far. The next section takes a preliminary look
at the question whether the legal principles that apply to
health plan interpretation and enforcement can resolve
disputes over benefit coverage.
VII.PROBLEMS

WITH

INTERPRETING

CONTRACTS

FOR

CONSUMERS AND PATIENTS

The drive to use contracts gains support from the idea
that contracts are voluntary agreements that operate under
well-known rules of law, so that enforcement should be both
97 Wendy K. Mariner, Patients' Rights After Health Care Reform: Who

Decides What Is Medically Necessary?, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1515 (1994).
98 Victoria Colliver, Palo Alto Clinic Goes
'Boutique,' S.F. CHRON., Mar. 25,
2003, at C3; Cindy Tumiel, The Doctor Will See You Now - Really; 'Boutique' Medicine
Offers Return of Old-Style Service, But at a Price, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS
(Texas), Dec. 9, 2002, at Al.
Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Cutbacks Imperil Health Coverage for State's
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at Al.
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relatively straightforward and automatic. However, both the
rules and their application are neither necessarily self evident
nor universally accepted.
I hypothesize that health insurance contracts have both
failed to control costs and instill consumer confidence because
they are based on a model of consumer choice that fails to fully
account for the real world of employment-based health
insurance and the needs of patients. After all, it is employers,
not consumers, who select the array of plans from which
employees choose. And it is patients, not consumers, who
demand care that increases costs. When consumers get sick,
they become patients, and patients do not necessarily want
contract limits enforced.
Resistance to contract limits may be exacerbated by an
ill fit between the law governing the terms of an insurance
contract and the substance of the contract terms: medical care.
Patients who resist contract enforcement may claim, in effect,
that contract or insurance law is the wrong law to govern their
medical care. A more nuanced claim might be that the general
rules governing insurance policies do not adequately take into
account what is promised, what is expected, or what is agreed
upon by parties to a group health plan. Thus, until the parties
agree on how the contract should be interpreted and what rules
should govern that process, they should not be expected to
adhere to an agreement without complaint.
A.

What Rules Govern Health Plans?

Legal principles provide standards for interpreting and
construing contracts and supply default rules where contracts
are silent or ambiguous. Yet many principles from several
areas of law, including contract, insurance, and tort, compete
for application to health plans, as illustrated in Figure 4 below.
State insurance legislation and regulations govern the
licensure and operation of insurance companies and most
managed care organizations, and impose some requirements on
the substance of insurance policies. ERISA, however, limits the
application of state legislation and common law that "relates
to" private employee group health plans that are subject to
ERISA.'" Simply choosing applicable rules can be a matter of
dispute. '
'00 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
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Figure 4: Legal Principles
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In theory, each promise in a contract may best fit a
particular legal doctrine. Contract doctrines function well in
defining what counts as an agreement and what circumstances
permit the parties to agree. Contract doctrines also do a good
job of defining predictable rights and duties, such as delivery of
goods or services that are specifically identifiable in advance.
For example, a promise to pay a fixed sum of money if an injury
See generally Karen A. Jordan, Coverage Denials in ERISA Plans: Assessing the
Federal Legislative Solution, 65 MO. L. REV. 405 (2000); Wendy K. Mariner, State
Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 335
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1986 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence on ERISA
preemption of state laws affecting managed care has evolved significantly in the past
decade. See, e.g., New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); De Buono v. NYSA-IIA Medical and Clinical Servs.
Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358
(1999). A new test was formulated this year for determining whether state laws qualify
for the exception to § 514 preemption because they regulate insurance. See Kentucky
Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
101 This is seen most often in disputes over whether ERISA preempts state
common law liability claims and state insurance laws. See Wendy K. Mariner,
Slouching Toward Managed Care Liability: Reflections on Doctrinal Boundaries,
Paradigm Shifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 253 (2001). The
Supreme Court recently agreed to hear appeals in two cases involving ERISA
preemption of state claims of MCO negligence. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.
Ct. 462 (granting writ of cert., Nov. 3, 2003); Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc. v. Calad,
124 S. Ct. 463 (Nov. 3, 2003 ) (granting writ of cert).
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occurs next year can be described and enforced by contract with
little debate. By contrast, a promise to provide appropriate
medical care if an illness occurs next year is more difficult to
specify. Deciding how to fulfill the promise - and what it will
cost - is far less predictable, especially in light of medical
advances and variations in provider competence and patient
preferences. Thus, certain kinds of promises to provide medical
care may be especially difficult to define, interpret, or enforce.
Indemnity health insurance mitigated the uncertainty by
delegating to physicians two key elements of insurance defining what counted as a covered loss and what counted as
payment for the loss. It is commonly understood that managed
care superseded indemnity health insurance because paying for
whatever medical care a physician recommended became too
costly. But indemnity insurance may have lasted as long as it
did not only because medical care was less expensive, but also
because insurers avoided the key elements that make
underwriting possible: carefully predicting risks and losses.
Insurance itself does not fit neatly into the typical
context of contract law. ' Professor E. Allen Farnsworth
suggests that insurance law developed as a separate field
because the general body of contract law did not adapt itself to
handle insurance disputes."3 Insurance law is the primary
source of legal doctrine governing insurance contracts, yet
insurance treatises devote relatively little attention specifically
to health insurance, often placing it in a chapter on "other
insurance issues.""' Most rules have been developed in the
context of commercial lines of insurance, and most health
insurance case law, apart from cases turning on issues of
ERISA preemption, involves individual insurance policies.'0 '
102 FARNSWORTH,

supra note 3, § 1.8 (stating that older contract treatises

regarded insurance as "outside the scope of general contract law"). See also James M.
Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?:Text
Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992). Standard treatises on contract law
typically mention health insurance contracts briefly as examples of standardized or
adhesion contracts, if at all. See, e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1-108 to 1-109 (J.E.
Murray, Jr., ed., rev. ed. 2002 & Spring Cum. Supp.); P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 273 (1995).
103 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3 at §1.10 (insurance law developed when
contract law did not succeed in adapting to insurance transactions).
104 See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 2 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES
§ 22.10 (2d ed. 2002); MALCOLM A. CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE:
AN INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE LAW (1997); HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 20; RuSS
& SEGALLA, supra note 20; ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (2d
ed. 1996); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 20.

"" Employee group health insurance often requires binding arbitration, and
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Basic principles of insurance policy construction are
intended to carry out the parties' intent as expressed in the
contract.' Unambiguous terms should be enforced as written.
However, not everyone agrees on what is ambiguous. Where
ambiguity exists, the doctrine of contra proferentum encourages
construing ambiguous terms against the drafter and in favor of
coverage.'07 Different interpretive approaches complicate
construction.' 8 On the one hand, courts should give contract
terms their ordinary meaning. On the other hand, courts
should also view each term in the context of the contract as a
whole in order to determine the meaning of individual rights
and duties. Thus, there is ample room for disagreement,
interpretation, and even maneuvering in construing policy
terms.
Employee group health insurance
has unique
characteristics that deviate from the assumptions underlying
general insurance law doctrine, especially individual first-party
insurance."n For example, the insurer and employer negotiate
the contract, which the employee rarely sees."' This raises
questions about what an employee can be deemed to agree to
and whether the employer can act on behalf of its employees
when it bears some or all of the cost of insurance."' Group
health insurance contracts are also standard form contracts,
which have non-negotiable terms to simplify their application
to a large population. Yet decisions about how to treat a patient
are highly individual. Corbin links insurance regulation with

the resulting decisions do not necessarily include explanations of the legal reasoning.
106 HOLMES & RHODES, supra
note 20, § 5.1.
7 id. § 6.1. See also Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance
Policy
Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 541 (1996) (comparing judicial approaches to the
doctrine of contraproferentum).
108 Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Unmet Expectations: Undue Restrictions of the
Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of the JudicialRole,
5 CONN. INS. J. 181 (1998) (describing variations in judicial interpretations of doctrine,
ambiguity, and expectations of the parties in contract construction and interpretation).
109See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health Insurance: A Balance
Sheet, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1999, at 124; Mariner, Standards of Care, supra
note 6, at 22-23.
11oEmployees typically receive a summary of how the health plan operates,
but not the contract between the employer and insurer or MCO. Mariner, Standardsof
Care, supra note 6, at 35.
...See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (finding that an
employer might not have contracted with Kaiser Permanente had it known that the
binding arbitration requirement was administered by the HMO and caused delays of 2
or more years, contrary to the expectations fostered by the contact).
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the goal of remedying unfairness in insurance contracts."' For
these reasons, the justifications for some legal doctrines - and
therefore, the manner in which those doctrines interpret some
contract terms - may not exist in the case of group health
insurance. At the very least, applying insurance rules
developed for first-party commercial insurance can produce
anomalous results.
Particular problems arise with respect to contracts of
adhesion."3 As Justice Stevens noted:
[Clourts traditionally have reviewed with heightened scrutiny the
terms of contracts of adhesion, form contracts offered on a take-orleave basis by a party with stronger bargaining power to a party
with weaker power. Some commentators have questioned whether
contracts of adhesion can justifiably be enforced at all under
traditional contract theory because the adhering party generally
enters into them without manifesting knowing and voluntary
consent to all their terms.14

However, most common law decisions recognize the
utility of standard form contracts in many commercial contexts
and review them for reasonableness." 5 Similarly, recent
Supreme Court opinions have allowed enforcement of
provisions in adhesion contracts. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute, a Washington state couple bought a ticket for a cruise
from a cruise company in Florida, through a travel agent in
Washington state."' The back of the ticket, received by mail,
contained a "contract" that included a forum-selection clause
requiring all disputes to be resolved in a court located in
Florida. Mrs. Shute sued the cruise line in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington for
injuries resulting when she slipped on a deck mat and fell
during a tour on the cruise. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held
...CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.14 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993). See also
HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 20, § 3.7. ERISA preempts enforcement of certain laws
against group health insurance plans offered by private employers, in complicated
ways. See supra notes 104-05.
'13 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom
of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
"4 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 601-02 (1991)
(Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1173 (1983), W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts:
Lawful Fraud in California,48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974), and KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAw TRADITION 370-371 (1960)).

"5 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
•. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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that the forum-selection clause was enforceable and precluded
suit outside Florida."7 It noted that "forum-selection clauses
contained in form passage contracts are subject to judicial
scrutiny for fundamental fairness," but found that there were
legitimate economic reasons for selecting a fixed forum for
disputes and no evidence of fraud, overreaching, or
discouraging passengers from bringing legitimate claims."'
Moreover, the Court noted that the Shutes did not deny that
the ticket gave them notice of the Florida court limitation.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented,
arguing that "only the most meticulous passenger is likely to
become aware of the forum-selection provision... 9 Moreover, he
noted, "many passengers, like the respondents ...will not have

an opportunity to read paragraph 8 [the forum-selection clause]
until they have actually purchased their tickets."'
Although forum-selection clauses likely will not trigger
disputes in health insurance contracts, the Court's treatment of
such clauses holds lessons for other standard contract
provisions. Certainly, Justice Stevens's comment that the
injured party may not have notice of the relevant contract
provision until he has purchased a ticket also applies to
provisions in insurance policies that are not delivered until
premiums are paid. Of course, health insurance premiums
typically are paid in monthly installments, so that, in theory, a
consumer could terminate participation in the plan after
reading the policy. However, there are barriers to changing
plans. Most employers permit changes only once a year.
Moreover, even if change is possible, most other plans available
17

The Court distinguished its prior opinion on forum-selection clauses,

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), which had noted that forumselection clauses, although not historically favored, are prima facie valid. Id. at 9-10.
The agreement in Bremen was between two business corporations to tow a drilling rig
from Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea off Italy, so that the parties might be expected to
pay attention to a forum-selection clause. The Court said that "a freely negotiated
private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power, such as that involved here, should be given full effect." Id. at 12-13.
This has led to the argument that, to be enforceable, such agreements should be freely
bargained for. In Bremen, the Court said that a party seeking to avoid enforcement of a
forum-selection clause on grounds of inconvenience of the forum has a "heavy burden of
proof."
.8 499 U.S. at 595. Reasons for including a forum-selection clause included
the fact that the company's principal place of business was in Florida, where some of
its cruises originated, and the assumption that limiting the fora in which to sue could
reduce the expenses of litigation and therefore ultimately help reduce fares.
19 Id. at 597.
120 Id.
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are likely to contain similar provisions. Thus, the fundamental
issue is not whether a consumer had notice of the objectionable
provision, but whether the substance of provision itself violates
public policy."'
In Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, the California
Supreme Court, while confirming its endorsement of binding
arbitration clauses in general, permitted a patient's estate to
defend against enforcement of the arbitration clause by
pursuing a claim of fraud against Kaiser Permanente."' There
was considerable evidence that Kaiser controlled the
arbitration process and either encouraged or permitted delays,
undermining arbitration's presumed advantages of speed and
simplicity.'22 The court agreed that this evidence supported the
possibility that Kaiser either misrepresented its arbitration
process or acted in reckless disregard of the facts. However, the
court required an additional step. Since Mr. Engalla's employer
selected the health plan, it was also necessary to find that the
employer relied on Kaiser's misrepresentation.
Few reported cases address the question whether
"boiler-plate" provisions, such as binding arbitration, forum
selection clauses, and notice of claim limitations, are
reasonable in a health plan contract. Although courts no longer
rotely apply the principle that an insured is bound by
everything in the policy regardless of whether she read it, that
remains the presumption unless mistake or fraud can be
shown. However, within the particular context of health plans,
See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 377 P.2d 284,
298
(Cal. 1962) (refusing to enforce insurance policy limitation on liability because insured
.must purchase the policy before he even knows its provisions"). In Carnival Cruise
Lines, Stevens offered examples of contract provisions that are generally against public
policy because they unduly limit a company's liability:
Complete exemptions from liability for negligence or limitations on the
amount of the potential damage recovery, requirements that notice of claims
be filed within an unreasonably short period of time, provisions mandating a
choice of law that is favorable to the defendant in negligence cases, and
forum-selection clauses are all similarly designed to put a thumb on the
carrier's side of the scale of justice.
499 U.S. at 599 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'22Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997). In
Engalla, the plaintiffs sought to rescind the arbitration clause, claiming fraud in the
inducement of the contract. Id. at 916. The patient filed a notice to arbitrate his claim
of malpractice by failing to diagnose cancer. Id. at 910. Before the arbitrators were
selected, the patient died, and the health plan intended to insist on limiting possible
compensation to the lesser death benefit under California law. Id. at 914.
123 An independent study reported that an
average of 674 days elapsed before
the appointment of a neutral arbitrator to commence proceedings, and 863 days before
a hearing began. Id. at 913.
121
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more scrutiny of adhesionary terms may be necessary to
determine what can reasonably be expected, both of patients
and insurers.
Tort law doctrines sometimes affect health insurance
disputes, and the line between tort and contract law can be
blurry in some circumstances. 4 A boundary-crossing example is
the tort of bad faith, generally defined as an insurer's refusal to
pay a contract claim that there is no bona fide cause to deny.''
Applying this tort doctrine to enforce a contract or remedy or
punish a breach of contract raises questions of when other legal
doctrines should supplement contract and insurance law. ' Tort
law appears particularly apt in the case of insurance because
courts often use tort law to determine responsibility for injury
when a dispute cannot be avoided, especially where the harm is
difficult to predict and social norms are still evolving.' 7
1

B.

Types of Disputes and Available Principles

One might expect disputes to arise most often in cases
where the promise itself is uncertain or one party did not or
could not agree to it. One would also expect that contract terms
with clear definitions of publicly understandable and easily
identifiable items or services, such as the amount of premiums
and co-payments, or procedures for obtaining services, leave
less room for disagreement. Disputes over procedural rules
have arisen, however, and what appears to be a clear
contractual term may not adequately express what is intended
or expected."n
Within the category of health plan provisions that give
rise to disputes, significant disagreements fall into five

"' P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpracticeand the Contract/TortBoundary, 49 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 287 (1986).
125 See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK
ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 12.01 (9th ed. 1998); Roger C. Henderson, The Tort
of Bad Faithin First-PartyInsurance TransactionsAfter Two Decades, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
1153 (1995).
126 See generally Nicholas J. Johnson, The Boundaries of Extracompensatory
Relief for Abusive Breach of Contract, 33 CONN. L. REV. 181 (2000); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic ContractLaw, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1745 (2000).
127 See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in PersonalInjury Law, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2403 (2000).
128 Carole Roan Gresenz, David M. Studdert, Nancy
Campbell & Deborah R.
Hensler, Patients in Conflict with Managed Care: A Profile of Appeals in Two HMOs,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2002, at 189.
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subcategories defined by the subject and degree of
uncertainty: n
1. Textual Ambiguity: Ambiguity in the contract text
that permits conflicting interpretations.
2. Medical Quality/Effectiveness Uncertainty: Uncertainty about whether an unambiguous contract covers a
specific item or service, such as a new technology, with the focus of dispute on the general effectiveness of the item or service
itself, including whether it is investigational or experimental.
3. Provider Competence: Uncertainty about whether an
unambiguous contract covers a specific physician, hospital or
other provider to perform a particular service, with the focus of
dispute on the provider's competence or other qualifications to
do so.
4. Patient Efficacy Uncertainty: Uncertainty about
whether an unambiguous contract covers a specific item or
service for an individual patient, with the focus of dispute on
the patient and her medical condition, including questions
about whether a proposed treatment is medically necessary or
appropriate to help a specific individual, regardless of whether
it may otherwise be considered standard therapy.
5. Preferences: Differences in the parties' preferences
for specific outcomes (such as a particular medical therapy or
referral to a particular specialist or facility), in the absence of
contractual ambiguity.
These "disputed" categories are likely to be found in the
contract provisions that (1) define covered benefits and
exclusions, including limitations on the number or dollar
129 These categories are derived from a review of reported cases and the few

empirical studies of such disputes. See Kanika Kapur, Carole Roan Gresenz & David
M. Studdert, Managing Care: Utilization Review in Action at Two Capitated Medical
Groups, HEALTH AFFARS, June 18, 2003, at W3-275, at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprintlhlthaff.w3.275vl.pdf; Mark A. Hall, Teresa Rust Smith, Michelle
Naughton & Andrea Ebbers, Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An
Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055 (1996);
Peter D. Jacobson, Elizabeth Selvin & Scott D. Pomfret, The Role of the Courts in
Shaping Health Policy: An Empirical Analysis, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 278 (2001);
Gresenz et al., supra note 128; Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry
and Consumer Protection:An EmpiricalAnalysis of State Supreme Courts' Bad-Faith,
Breach-of-Contract,Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faithand Excess-Judgment Decisions,
41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325 (1992). Of course, reported judicial decisions are not
necessarily representative of the universe of disputes, most of which never get to court.
See William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe
l'Oeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV. 49 (1998); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill,
"Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1339 (1994). Future research may identify other issues.
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amount of covered items and services, and (2) specify the terms
on which specific providers, including physicians and hospitals,
are available to patients. These are the provisions that embody
two of the three major techniques that MCOs use to control
costs: controls over covered services and medical decision
making, and limits on patient choice of provider. ' °
In the first category, in theory, more precise drafting
can correct ambiguous terms. Still, it may be impossible to
define certain benefits with sufficient precision to avoid at least
some vagueness. ' Then the question is whether the provision
is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction.
Even when terms are clear, courts may apply different
approaches to construing the contract, from a classical strict
interpretation to a more equitable approach using general
principles of reasonable expectations.' Here again, the parties
may have different expectations based on conflicting views of
the purpose and function of health insurance.'" Insurers may
consider the contract a straightforward financial obligation to
pay for specifically defined treatments in carefully delineated
circumstances. Consumers may view the contract as promising
whatever medical care might work. What counts as a
reasonable expectation on the part of consumer? Any answer
necessarily adopts a particular viewpoint as to the role of
insurance in distributing health care.
The second, third, and fourth categories of disputes
raise these problems with greater intensity. While provisions
governing providers and treatment might be made clearer and
more enforceable by contract methods, they also depend on
specific circumstances arising after the contract is made. For
example, categories two and three might require reference to
130 See Laura Tollen & Robert M. Crane, A Temporary Fix? Implications of the

Move Away from Comprehensive Benefits, EBRI Issue Brief, No. 244, April 2002; Jacob
S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, The Misleading Language of Managed Care, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1033 (1999). The third technique, using provider networks and
transferring financial risk to providers, is the subject of the contract between the MCO
and the provider, which is beyond the scope of this discussion.
,31 See Mariner supra note 34, at 241; M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of
Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 292 (2003). There may also be circumstances in
which one or both parties may prefer vague terms to more precise definitions. See
George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the
Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2?, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1079 (2002).
...RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 20, § 21.3; 2 HOLMES & RHODES, supra note
20, § 5.1.
1, See generally Deborah A. Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking
InsuranceLaw Through Stories, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1435 (1994).
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objective evidence of the effectiveness of therapies and the
competence of providers, respectively. It may be possible for the
parties to agree on, or at least make explicit, acceptable
measures of quality and competence, where they exist. But
quality of care measures are still developing and do not yet
evaluate the universe of options.
Where there are no measures, deciding what the benefit
covers requires judgment. Many ERISA plans grant the plan
administrator the sole discretion to interpret plan terms,
including whether a treatment is medically necessary for a
patient. Yet in the eyes of patients, clarity about who will
interpret the contract does not necessarily legitimize the
exercise of that discretion. Even the Supreme Court has hinted
that the deference it has shown to a fiduciary acting under a
contractual grant of discretion may not be appropriate where
conflicts of interest taint the decision.'34 Although all MCOs
have varying financial interests that may conflict with patient
care decisions, courts have not yet developed appropriate
standards for weighing conflicts and judging the exercise of
discretion. Thus, the scope of benefits may remain uncertain
despite provisions assigning discretionary authority to the
insurer.
Disputes such as those in category four, about whether
a treatment is medically necessary, also may require some
outside assistance. For example, an independent professional
organization or panel could make an unbiased professional
determination of need and appropriateness for individual
patients. More than forty states have created external
independent review panels to review these types of disputes.3 '
134

In Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 384 n.15 (2002), the

majority opinion noted, in a footnote, "An issue implicated by this case but requiring no
resolution is the degree to which a plan provision for unfettered discretion in benefit
determinations guarantees truly deferential review." The majority noted that "review
for abuse of discretion would home in on any conflict of interest on the plan fiduciary's
part, if a conflict was plausibly raised." Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (holding that although appellate courts generally review
benefit decisions de novo, where the plan grants the plan fiduciary discretion to
construe plan terms, courts should give that judgment deference and review it for
abuse of discretion)). Significantly, it added, "It is a fair question just how deferential
the review can be when the judicial eye is peeled for conflict of interest." Id.
135 Wendy K. Mariner, Independent External Review of Health Maintenance
Organizations'Medical Necessity Decisions, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2178 (2002) (finding
that, in 2002, 41 states and the District of Columbia had legislation providing for
independent external review of varying disputes, with most covering medical necessity,
others also including experimental treatment, and still others covering some additional
disputes). The Supreme Court held that ERISA did not preempt Illinois' narrow statute

20041

CONSUMER-CHOICEPLANS

When established and operated under transparently fair
standards, independent review panels give consumers some
assurance that their benefits will not be denied for financial
reasons alone. However, these review panels do not prevent
disputes; they are intended to resolve disputes without the
need for litigation or arbitration.
Ideally, review panels can help to develop more
consistent decisions about what kinds of treatment are
appropriate in what circumstances. Professional opinion,
however, is not necessarily dispositive. In 2001 in
Massachusetts, an MCO denied coverage for a liver transplant
for a patient with Hepatitis C and HIV. The denial rested on
the ground that the transplant was experimental and thus
excluded from coverage under the patient's employment-based
managed care plan.'3 An independent external review panel
confirmed the experimental nature of the procedure and thus
the denial. Publicity about the case generated donations to pay
for the transplant. The patient underwent two successive
transplants, but died from predicted complications. Aware of
publicity about that case, the Massachusetts Medicaid program
agreed to pay for the same procedure for a different patient
with the same medical conditions, despite similar coverage
limits under Medicaid. These cases raise fundamental
questions about whether it is possible to define covered benefits
when medical therapies are changing, why patients or insurers
consider some decisions fair and others unfair, and how
publicity affects the distribution of health care and dollars.
The fifth subcategory may include disputes for which
there is no obvious contractual solution. Here, threshold
questions are whether preferences should carry any weight in
determining coverage, and, if so, whether they should apply
only in circumstances in which services of equivalent benefit
(or cost) are available. Regardless of one's views on these
questions, disputes based largely on preferences probably will
continue to arise. Minimizing such disputes will require
creative responses. For example, a contract might provide a
sum of money equivalent to the cost of standard therapy that
the patient could use to pay for his preferred provider or

in Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
136 Liz Kowalczyk, Donors and HMO Bolster Ailing Activist Funds Raised for
Liver Transplant, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2001, at Al.
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service. The possible options depend upon the objectives of
insurers and patients and what they believe is fair.
Ideally, one would conduct an empirical study to test the
forgoing hypotheses and to investigate more precisely which
promises give rise to disputes, comparing those promises with
available principles and rules of law to determine which
promises fit the principles.'37 The kinds of questions that should
be asked include: What kinds of contract terms give rise to
disputes? What are the reasons for these disputes? Which
reasons are based in the difficulties of predicting the cost or
availability of future medical therapies? Which are based on
the parties' financial needs? Which result from not
understanding what the contract means or having different
expectations? Which of these can be resolved by applying legal
doctrines? Where legal doctrines do not fit promises, can
contracts be changed to fit legal doctrine or should alternative
methods be used to govern the relationship between insurer
and patient? Are alternatives best suited to adoption as
legislation or as common law doctrine by courts?
Answers to these questions will not remove the
economic pressures on health care costs. However, they should
permit a clearer definition of what contracts can and cannot
prescribe in health insurance, and what people can realistically
agree to. Further analysis should permit the design of more
effective contracts for different kinds of health insurance, and
suggest alternative methods for addressing health insurance
problems that do not fit the contractual model.
C.

Supplemental or Alternative Doctrines

The field of health law draws on a wide range of
common law and legislation." Thus, one might go beyond
traditional insurance doctrines to find principles that could
clarify the rights and duties in the context of health plans. A
brief look at some potential candidates, however, reveals that
they, too, have been developed largely outside the context of
health plans.

"' Some studies have begun to identify the types of disputes in a sample of
health plans, see supra note 129 and accompanying text, but these studies do not
explicitly address the relationship between contract drafting and governing law.
138 See generally Bloche, supra note 131, at 292 (finding that different bodies
of law do not take health care into account to a significant degree).
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1.

Requirements Contracts

Health insurance contracts are structured in much the
same way as ordinary requirements contracts, in which a seller
agrees to sell, and a buyer agrees to buy, all of the goods or
services required by the buyer."' Insurance policies involve an
agreement on the part of the insurer to provide goods and
services to treat illness and injury as they occur to the insured,
1 4'
Like
in return for the insured's payment of premiums.
illusory
are
requirements contracts, health insurance policies
in the sense that one party retains complete discretion whether
to perform, either by producing medical services or by paying
for them. There is little risk of nonpayment on the part of the
insured or buyer, because employers typically deduct amounts
from employee wages to pay premiums. Thus, freedom to
perform or not ordinarily belongs entirely to the insurer.
Disputes over whether a service is "medically necessary"
and therefore a covered benefit mimic disputes in requirements
contracts over whether goods demanded by a purchaser were
"required" within the meaning of a requirements contract.
Generally, the buyer who is party to a requirements contract is
entitled to receive whatever amount of goods are in fact
required by him for his business, and the seller is required to
produce and deliver that amount, even if it increases
unexpectedly.1 4 ' However, both parties are bound to act
reasonably in making demands."' Therefore, a seller-defendant
is entitled to assert and prove that the demands were "in
139

See, e.g., New York Cent. Iron Works Co. v. United States Radiator Co.,

174 N.Y. 331, 334, 66 N.E. 967, 968 (1903) (finding that "the parties left the contract
open and indefinite as to the quantity of goods that the plaintiff might order from time
to time").
,40 Of course, the insured does not pay for each unit of service as it is
delivered, but instead pays an actuarially determined fixed premium.
141 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
142 One party is not necessarily entitled to increase quantities to an unlimited
degree. The Uniform Commercial Code rule states that:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may
occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to
any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or
otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or
demanded.
U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1977).
The parties may agree to limit the amount of variation, for example, to a
certain percentage of prior years' quantities. In the absence of express agreement, one
party may object to substantial changes in quantity on the ground of mistake. See infra
note 155 and accompanying text.
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excess of the plaintiffs reasonable needs and were not justified
by the conditions of the business or the customs of the trade.' 43
This is another way of ensuring that the parties act in good
faith and in pursuit of the purpose of the contract.
What counts as "required" for purposes of a health
insurance policy? Case law on requirements contracts offers
little to answer this question beyond general statements of
good faith and fair dealing. Patients do not have business
customs of the type courts often consider to assess whether a
buyer was demanding an unreasonable amount of goods. Nor
are patients in a position to demand additional services for the
purpose of taking advantage of unexpectedly favorable market
conditions that would make it highly profitable to acquire more
goods from the seller at price that is now well below market.
Rather, the patient's "requirements" are entirely personal.
Perhaps the only independent or external standard for judging
the reasonableness of a patient's demands - whether a
treatment is "required" - are generally accepted medical
standards of care.
2. Personal Services Contracts
To the extent that managed care plans require the plan
to determine the nature of the services to be provided as
covered benefits, whether by pre-authorization or other means,
they operate like contracts for personal services. Thus, disputes
over the nature or quality of services for covered benefits share
features with disputes over other personal service contracts.
The standard assumption in personal service contracts - that
specific performance is not available to enforce a contract for
personal services - does not quite fit health insurance or
managed care, since such contracts do not typically promise a
specific provider or service.'" Nonetheless, disputes over
services often focus on whether what the plan is willing to offer
will meet the medical needs of the patient. This brings to mind
the rule concerning "comparable" offers in personal service
contract disputes, most often used in cases in which a promised
143 New York Central Iron Works
Co., 174 N.Y. at 335, 66 N.E. at 968 ("In
other words, that the plaintiff was not acting reasonably or in good faith, but using the
contract for a purpose not within the contemplation of the parties ...).
144 Exceptions to this categorization
include plans that cover a specific number
of procedures over a specific time period, such as mammograms, immunizations, and
dental cleaning.
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position does not materialize and the person to perform the
service rejects a proffered alternative. The "performer" must
mitigate damages, if possible, usually by accepting an offer of
alternative employment. One might argue that patients should
mitigate possible damages by accepting the substitute
treatment or provider offered by the insurer. However, the
alternative must be "comparable" or "substantially similar" to
that promised by the original agreement.'4 What is comparable
is highly fact-dependent. Substitutes that are "different and
inferior" do not ordinarily qualify as comparable, and the
"performer" may reject them.'46
The burden of demonstrating comparability could
reasonably fall upon an insurer who determines what counts as
"medically necessary" treatment. However, health plans rarely
promise a specific treatment that could be compared with the
offered substitute. In addition, if the alternative is not an
acceptable substitute, the remedy is the amount of
145 See,

e.g., Manuma v. Blue Hawaii Adventures, Inc., No. 24433, 2002 Haw.
App. LEXIS 369 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2002). In Manuma, the court found the
following:
[Tihe measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount
of compensation agreed upon for the remaining period of service, less the
amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or
with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment ....Before
projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or
accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the
employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or
substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived; the
employee's rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a
different or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages.
Id. at *3-*4.
Plaintiff was hired as entertainment director/musician for dinner cruises
for twelve months, but terminated after eight months due to the employer's financial
difficulties and offered manual labor in a shipyard or yacht maintenance instead. Id. at
*1-*2. The court found neither job was "substantially similar," and affirmed an award
of damages, but, oddly, found no error in the district court's reduction of damages,
which offset it by two months worth of compensation for which the plaintiff could or
should have found other comparable employment in satisfaction of a duty to mitigate
damages. The court did not explain why it thought he could have found two months of
comparable work. Id. at *3.
'46 See, e.g., Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689, 693
(Cal. 1970). In Parker, Shirley MacLaine contracted for $750,000 to play the lead in a
musical motion picture, "Bloomer Girl," to be filmed in Los Angeles, with rights to
approve the screenplay and director changes. The film company instead offered her the
lead in a non-musical western entitled "Big Country, Big Man" to be filmed in
Australia, for the same fee but without approval rights. Id. at 690-91. The Supreme
Court of California upheld a trial court ruling that MacLaine was entitled to reject the
western because it was "different and inferior" to the promised musical. The court held
that MacLaine had no duty to mitigate damages and awarded her the full promised fee.
Id. at 693.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2

compensation that would have been paid for the original
position. However, in many health benefit disputes, the patient
seeks a service that is more expensive than what the insurer
offered. Therefore, if the insurer offers only the cost of its
preferred, less costly, alternative, the patient is likely to
remain dissatisfied and often unable to pay for the desired
service.
3. Mistake
In disputes over covered benefits or qualified providers,
patients might feel that there has been a mistake in the
contract - or in the assumptions underlying the contract - that
should be corrected in order to permit the patient to obtain the
services he seeks. Mistakes do not reflect the agreement of the
parties. The doctrine of mistake is rarely applied, however, and
does not easily fit disputes over benefit coverage in health
plans."7 It is difficult to identify the agreement of the parties on
a specific treatment, because health plans do not ordinarily
specify the particular treatment that will be covered in an
individual case of illness. Indeed, these disputes might be
characterized as instances of erroneous assumptions as to the
value of the health plan to the patient."'
Applied to insurance contracts, which allocate risk by
definition, there is little room for forcing an insurer to provide
a service that it did not contemplate. Yet, here again, the rule
is based on assumptions about expectations and behavior in the
commercial market that do not necessarily pertain when a
14' The remedy for mistakes is typically reformation
of the contract.
Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). In
Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, the Court held:
Courts have traditionally applied three remedial rules in cases of mistake,
frustration and impracticability. In some cases courts declare that no
contract ever arose because there was no true agreement between the parties
... or because the parties were ignorant of existing facts which frustrated the
purpose of one party or made performance impracticable. Restatement 2d of
Contracts § 286. In some other cases the courts hold that a contract is
voidable on one of the three theories. In these cases the customary remedy is
rescission. In both classes of cases where one or both parties have performed
under the supposed contract, the courts award appropriate restitution in the
light of the benefits the parties have conferred on each other. The aim is to
prevent unjust enrichment. The courts in such cases often call this remedy
'reformation' in the loose sense of 'modification.'
Id. at 78.
148 Corbin notes that the law should ordinarily enforce
agreements despite
variation in the value of the agreement. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.35 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993).
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patient seeks treatment for severe illness. Patients may not
stoically "swallow their losses and disappointments," because
such losses are not merely financial and are not business as
usual.
Related doctrines of frustration and impracticability,
most often relevant to commercial contracts, do not seem
pertinent to health insurance, unless one could argue that it
would be financially impractical for an insurer to provide an
expensive service because the expenditure would threaten the
insurer with insolvency. However, relief from performance is
not ordinarily granted unless a supervening post-contract
event renders performance impossible.14 9 In the case of
unexpected cost increases, few courts have allowed relief unless
the increase was at least twice the expected costs of
performance.'" Finally, since the remedy for frustrated or
impracticable performance is discharging the insurer from
performing, as by excusing it from providing or paying for the
service, it offers no advantage over general rules of insurance
policy construction. Indeed, these doctrines would only seem to
apply where there is no dispute as to coverage and where
providing the concededly covered benefit would bankrupt the
company - a rather remote possibility.
There is some support for the idea that where an event
is unforeseeable in a commercial sense, risk could not be
allocated in advance and therefore there is no reason to resort
to tortured interpretations in order to find that one party did
assume the risk of the event. There may be illnesses or
treatments that are not foreseeable, in the sense that an
insurer would not have included their costs in the actuarial
calculations of underwriting. In that case, however, application
of the doctrine of impracticability would argue against
149

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981).

Performance may be impracticable because extreme and unreasonable
difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties will be involved .... A
mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as
increased wages, prices of raw materials, or costs of construction, unless well
beyond the normal range, does not amount to impracticability since it is the
sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is intended to cover.
Id.
Comment d to Section 281 states that the term "impracticability" is taken
from Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a). Id. § 1355, cmt. d.
150 Aluminum Co. of America, 499 F. Supp. at 79 ("To frame an equitable
remedy where frustration, impracticability or mistake prevent strict enforcement of a
long term executory contract requires a careful examination of the circumstances of the
contract, the purposes of the parties, and the circumstances which upset the
contract.").
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requiring the insurer to provide the treatment. This is because
it focuses on the cost impact of performance, and not on the loss
to the insured, regardless of whether that loss results in death
or disability from lack of treatment.
The doctrine of frustration seems even less relevant. In
a health insurance context it would seem to apply, if at all, to
the patient rather than the insurer. The doctrine relieves a
party from performance when performance would be of little or
no value to him because of intervening circumstances. Here,
typically, the party is disappointed because he would like to
perform.'51 It is difficult to imagine cases in which events would
conspire to disappoint insurers, since their obligation is to pay
for services. Similarly, patients are not likely to be
disappointed by not needing medical care. Moreover, even if the
doctrine applied, it would only excuse the patient's
performance, which consists of paying insurance premiums and
copayments; it would not require performance of a different
sort from the insurer.
The sketch of these contract concepts illustrates how
basic rules, albeit somewhat flexible, do not have obvious
application to health insurance contracts. It is not clear that
health insurance relationships can be structured entirely by
contract unless principles in contract and insurance law can be
adapted to better fit health insurance.
D.

The Need for Research on Contracts and Doctrine

There has been little specific research on the legal tool
52
for financing and delivering health care: the contract itself.'
Practicing attorneys rarely have an opportunity to contemplate
how a contract should be structured to serve the health care
system's goals, rather than the immediate needs of their
clients. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
produces model state laws and regulations for all types of
"" The Restatement gives the example of B promising to pay A $1,000 to
watch a parade from A's window on a certain day, but the parade is cancelled because
an official is ill. B would like to watch the parade and there is no impediment to his
looking out the window, but B refuses to pay A the $1,000 because there is no parade to
be seen. B's duty to pay the $1,000 is discharged and he is not liable for breach of
contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §265 illus. 1 (1981).
152 A notable exception is George Washington University's
collection and
description of state Medicaid contracts, which do not address private health insurance.
See George Washington University Center for Health Services Research and Policy,
Managed
Care
Contracting: Overview,
at
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/
managedcare.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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insurance, some of which recommend language for certain
health insurance contract terms."' However, they do not
address how the common law can or should be applied to
unregulated contract terms. Thus, there are almost no
independent sources of analysis of health insurance contracts.
Legal teaching and scholarship focuses heavily on
judicial doctrine and abstract legal theory, with scant attention
to its application to health insurance or health policy." Few
law professors are trained in empirical research and even fewer
receive external funding, with most research money going to
law and economics studies. As Professor Deborah Rhode notes,
"For most legal scholars, data are a luxury good.' 55 Yet, despite,
or perhaps because of, the lack of data about a legal doctrine's
effectiveness in achieving its own goals, it is doctrine that
drives the drafting, interpretation, and enforcement of
contracts.
Health law scholars, who are well positioned to use
their familiarity with the health care system to examine
relevant doctrine, have not emphasized analyses of theory.
Perhaps because health law is an applied field covering so
many areas of law, a focus on theory in one domain, like
contract, may appear too narrow. Scholarship in health law
often polarizes over the advantages and disadvantages of
managed care." Health law scholars have devoted more
attention to ERISA preemption of liability for injury to patients
than to contract or insurance law.'57 The primary focus of this
MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES (Nat'l Assoc. of Ins. Comm'rs
'5
2002). See generally Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States:
Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999).
15 See, e.g., Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom,Freedom of Contract,and the "Rise and
Fall," 79 B. U. L. REV. 263 (1999).
155 Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327,
1353
(2002).
" Compare, e.g., PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND

MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA (2002) (arguing that MCO decisions should not
be judged on the basis of contract law and in favor of treating health care as a special
category, rather than a consumer good), with Richard A. Epstein, Managed Care Under
Siege, 24 J. MED. & PHIL. 434 (1999) (arguing that health care should be considered a
consumer good properly distributed by voluntary contracts).
"57 Compare, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, What Recourse? - Liability for ManagedCare Decisions and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 343 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 592 (2000), Arnold J. Rosoff, Breach of Fiduciary Duty Lawsuits Against MCOs:
What's Left After Pegram v. Herdrich?, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 55 (2001), and Peter D.
Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achieving
Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence,35 HOUS. L. REV. 985 (1998) (favoring
MCO liability), with David A. Hyman, Accountable Managed Care: Should We Be
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debate is whether ERISA does or should preempt a variety of
state law claims against MCOs; it rarely progresses to the next
question, namely whether, if state law applies, it satisfactorily
addresses those claims." Yet, if state law is no better equipped
to decide disputes over health benefits than ERISA decision
rules, little is gained by avoiding preemption. Most important,
liability applies only after a dispute arises - a dispute typically
rooted in the contract.
Since prevention is better than compensation or
punishment, everyone would be better served by contracts that
did not give rise to disputes in the first place. This requires
attention to what contracts should cover and how they can and
should be written to serve the needs of patients, providers, and
insurers in different circumstances in the future. It also
requires determining which legal principles best fit different
managed care and health insurance functions, either for
consumers or patients. The goal should be to crystallize the
most effective role for contracts in obtaining access to care, and
help policy makers and the public take concrete steps toward
developing a fair and sustainable health care system for the
future. It should assist health insurers and employers to
develop fairer, more effective contractual provisions, and
consumers and patients to understand how they might
participate in new forms of health insurance. It should also
help legislators and other health policy makers determine
which health insurance issues can be left to private contracting
and which may require regulation. The selective and effective
use of well-designed contracts may reduce the pressure on costs
that has arisen from controversial provisions in the managed
care contractual model. And while contracts cannot guarantee
access to adequate health care, they can make it possible. If
individuals are to have fair and equitable access to medical
care in the future, it will be essential to develop contracts that
serve the needs of patients, as well as employers and insurers.
Careful for What We Wish For?, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785 (1999), and Richard A.
Epstein & Alan 0. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA
Preemption, and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625 (2001) (arguing against MCO
liability).
1 Some scholars have proposed new theories of liability for MCOs. See, e.g.,
Peter D. Jacobson & Michael T. Cahill, Applying Fiduciary Responsibilities in the
Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 155 (2000) (arguing that MCOs should have
fiduciary duties to their members); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating
Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2000) (arguing
that organizations should be accountable for the quality of care provided their
patient/members).
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS

It is time to rethink the conceptual framework for
health insurance contracts and clearly define what insurers
and patients can and cannot fairly agree upon in advance
through contracts. A new framework could help to advance our
knowledge about which types of promises should be included in
health care contracts and which types should be jettisoned
because they will not be kept.
Currently, the contracts that are intended to be the
vehicle for distributing health care often become a roadblock
instead. This may be because they are not capable of
performing all the functions expected of them, at least as
viewed through current doctrine. In the absence of more
nuanced standards for interpreting and enforcing contracts
that attempt to define legal rights to medical care and
responsibility for providing it, health insurance contracts are
likely to remain the source - rather than the resolution - of
disagreement.
Current consumer-choice reform proposals do not
address the legal principles governing health benefit plans or
health insurance contracts. Rather, they perpetuate the
problem by relying on contracts to reduce health care costs.
Consumer-choice plans shift responsibility for saving the
system money from employers and insurers onto consumers not by denying care to consumers, but by having consumers
deny care to their futures selves as patients.
It is possible that these plans effectively address some
real consumer choices - those that are possible without
insurance. They may eliminate many managed care features
that
annoyed
consumers,
like
gatekeepers
and
preauthorization of care. They may work well for routine and
preventive care that fit descriptions of consumer services. But
they are likely to fail to address the most difficult problems
facing patients: whether expensive care is medically necessary,
and what law applies. For patients with expensive medical
needs, consumer-choice plans may merely postpone the
inevitable question of whether their care is covered by a
defined package of benefits, without offering an answer that
avoids disputes in the first place. If constrained by today's
employment-based health insurance system, they are unlikely
to solve the fundamental problems in that system: the rising
cost of care and the inequitable distribution of care.
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Much of the scholarly debate on health care policy
focuses on whether health care - and health insurance - should
be distributed by voluntary contract or subject to government
standards. However, in the absence of any universal consensus
on the nature of justice in health care distribution, health
insurance remains to a large degree a matter of private
contract. Moreover, whatever form any future health care
system takes, contracts will play a key distributive role. Yet we
do not fully understand where private contracting does and
does not work to further the goals of equitable access to
affordable care. In particular, no health reform that relies on
contracts can succeed if it fails to remedy the resistance to
contract limits experienced in the managed care context. As a
first step, this Article has critiqued the ability of consumerchoice contracts to lessen that resistance, concluding that we
still need to identify the ways in which contracts can be written
and interpreted to meet the needs of both insurers and patients
before all parties will accept them as fair, reasonable, and
enforceable.

